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Keynote Address 
MCCLESKEY V. KEMP: FIELD NOTES FROM  
1977–1991 
John Charles Boger 
ABSTRACT—The litigation campaign that led to McCleskey v. Kemp did 
not begin as an anti-death-penalty effort. It grew in soil long washed in the 
blood of African-Americans, lynched or executed following rude 
semblances of trials and hasty appeals, which had prompted the NAACP 
from its very founding to demand “simple justice” in individual criminal 
cases. When the Warren Court signaled, in the early 1960s, that it might be 
open to reflection on broader patterns of racial discrimination in capital 
sentencing, the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.  (LDF) 
began to gather empirical evidence and craft appropriate constitutional 
responses. As that effort built, other deficiencies in state capital states 
became apparent, and LDF eventually asserted a broader constitutional 
critique of state capital structures and processes. By 1967, LDF and its 
allies had developed a nationwide “moratorium” campaign that challenged 
death sentencing statutes in virtually every state.    
Though the campaign appeared poised for partial success in 1969, 
changes in Court personnel and shifts in the nation’s mood dashed LDF’s 
initial hopes. Yet unexpectedly, in 1972, five Justices ruled in Furman v. 
Georgia that all death sentences and all capital statutes nationwide would 
fall under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments. Each of the nine Furman Justices wrote separately, without a 
single governing rationale beyond their expressed uneasiness that the death 
penalty was being imposed infrequently, capriciously, and in an arbitrary 
manner. Thirty-five states promptly enacted new and revised capital 
statutes. Four years later, a majority of the Court held that three of those 
new state statutes met Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment standards. The 
1976 Court majority expressed confidence that the states’ newly revised 
procedures should work to curb the arbitrariness and capriciousness that 
had earlier troubled the Furman majority. 
The McCleskey case emerged from subsequent review of post-Furman 
sentencing patterns in the State of Georgia. A brilliant and exhaustive study 
by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues demonstrated that the Court’s 
assumptions in 1976 were wrong; strong racial disparities in capital 
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sentencing continued to persist statewide in Georgia—especially in cases in 
which the victims of homicide were white. The Supreme Court eventually 
heard and decided this case, ruling five to four against Warren 
McCleskey’s claims in 1987. Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion purported to 
accept in theory, but appears grievously to have misunderstood or 
disregarded in fact, McCleskey’s powerful and unrebutted evidence of 
racial discrimination. Justice Powell’s decision likewise appears to have 
contorted the Court’s prior Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, erecting all-but-insuperable future barriers against statistical 
proof of racial discrimination anywhere within the criminal justice system.  
This Symposium reflects on the handiwork of the Court in McCleskey 
and its subsequent impact. As one member of the legal team who brought 
the case, my contribution is to speculate on how and why the Court might 
have acquiesced in the face of such troubling patterns in capital sentencing, 
despite the Justices’ clear condemnation of racial discrimination in 
principle and their occasional intervention to curb particularly egregious 
acts of racial injustice. This Essay ends by encouraging social scientists and 
legal scholars to continue to uncover and oppose patterns of racial 
discrimination that remain widespread in the administration of criminal 
justice. 
 
AUTHOR—Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My thanks to Professor 
Destiny Peery and student members of the Northwestern University Law 
Review for conceiving and hosting this outstanding Symposium, “‘A Fear 
of Too Much Justice’? Equal Protection and the Social Sciences 30 Years 
After McCleskey v. Kemp,” and for expanding their invitation beyond the 
roster of distinguished empiricists and legal scholars to include a 
practitioner-relic from an earlier time. I am also grateful to my life partner, 
Jennifer Boger, for many suggestions and edits to this Essay, and for her 
perpetual good cheer and support during my years of capital defense 
litigation. 
 
In the 1980s, I was part of a legal team that represented Warren 
McCleskey, a death-sentenced inmate forever linked with the Supreme 
Court decision that is the object of this thirtieth anniversary Symposium. 
Warren was an African-American, born into poverty and family 
dysfunction in Marietta, Georgia.1 He was convicted and sentenced to death 
 
 1 JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN 
DEATH PENALTY 11–13 (2015). McCleskey never knew his natural father. His mother Willie Mae 
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in Fulton County, Georgia, in 1978 for the murder of an Atlanta police 
officer, Frank Schlatt, during an armed robbery of the Dixie Furniture 
Store.2 Warren was ultimately executed in Georgia’s electric chair on 
September 25, 1991.3 
Although the McCleskey case occupied much of my professional life 
for over a decade, my reflections—on the Court’s treatment of David 
Baldus’s sophisticated empirical evidence, Justice Lewis Powell’s much-
criticized constitutional rationales, the decision’s subsequent reach—
inevitably begin with historical forces at work long before April 22, 1987 
when McCleskey v. Kemp was announced. Professor Reva Siegel sounds an 
historical theme in her opening Essay.4 I am drawn to conclude in a related 
vein. 
For McCleskey certainly did not begin with me, nor with Warren 
McCleskey, nor with the Baldus study, nor with the Rehnquist Court’s 
1985 Term. It began, in my view, no later than the dawn of the twentieth 
century, when the NAACP, formed in 1909 under the leadership of W.E.B. 
Du Bois and his colleagues, committed its energies to organize, to lobby, 
and, eventually, to move into state and federal courts to combat the 
relentless regime of racial subordination and oppression that was Jim 
Crow.5 
While the principal legal objectives of the NAACP and its legal arm, 
which eventually incorporated separately as the NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), were to enlarge and expand affirmative 
rights for law-abiding African-American people—voting, equal educational 
opportunities, workplace fairness, and residential opportunities6—the 
 
McCleskey raised six children in the “Skid Row” section of Marietta, where violence and random death 
were a daily threat. For a time, he was placed with an aunt who often beat him. When Warren was eight 
years old, his mother married a physically abusive man, John Henry Brooks, who drank and often beat 
his wife and stepchildren. The family ran an illegal gambling casino in their ramshackle home, where 
Warren and his brothers and sisters were obliged to serve alcohol to the rowdy patrons. Id. 
 2 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283, 285 (1987); see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 15–
17. 
 3 Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate is Executed After ‘Chaotic’ Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/26/us/georgia-inmate-is-executed-after-chaotic-legal-
move.html [https://perma.cc/ZMX4-GKA9]. 
4 Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Supreme Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of 
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey—And Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 
(2018).  
 5 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 96–101 (2004); DAVID LEVERING 
LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1869–1919, at 386–407 (1993); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, 
LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1–16 (2009). 
 6 The NAACP “pledged itself to work for the abolition of all forced segregation, equal education 
for Negro and white children, the complete enfranchisement of the Negro, and the enforcement of the 
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organization repeatedly found itself compelled to deploy its scarce 
resources defensively as well, to protect men and women of color suspected 
of crimes against blatant acts by white prosecutors and judges, and often by 
white mobs,7 who bypassed or shortcut or distorted ordinary criminal 
processes to deny “simple justice” to African-American communities.8 
NAACP lawyers were especially drawn into Southern courtrooms to 
defend capitally charged black men in egregious cases that did reach state 
courts for trial—Moore v. Dempsey9 and Powell v. Alabama,10 among a 
score of others—contesting such travesties as police interrogation 
conducted from the barrel of a shotgun or a noose around the suspect’s 
neck, or jury selection processes in which all the black names mysteriously 
disappeared from jury lists.11 The LDF’s celebrated team of mid-twentieth-
century legal counsel—Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley, 
Robert Carter, and Jack Greenberg—each did service in hostile Southern 
courthouses where their clients’ lives, and their own safety as counsel, 
hung precariously in balance.12 
 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.” JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 439 (1947). 
 7 John Hope Franklin reported that “[i]n the last sixteen years of the nineteenth century there had 
been more than 2,500 lynchings, the great majority of which were of Negroes.” Id. at 431. While there 
was some hope that the new twentieth century might bring a change, instead, the years from 1900 until 
the beginning of World War I witnessed more than 1,100 additional lynchings. Id. at 432. In response, 
the NAACP joined with those like Ida B. Wells-Barnett to lobby Congress for federal anti-lynching 
statutes, a campaign repeatedly thwarted by the power of Southern members of the United States 
Senate. See, e.g., KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 119–29; SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 105–10, 194–97; 
Thomas C. Holt, The Lonely Warrior: Ida B. Wells-Barnett and the Struggle for Black Leadership, in 
BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 39, 42–43, 53–54, 59–60 (John Hope Franklin & 
August Meier eds., 1982). 
 8 FRANKLIN, supra note 6, at 439–40, 478–79; KLUGER, supra note 5, at 100–01; SULLIVAN, supra 
note 5, at 18–19. 
 9 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
 10 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 11 KLUGER, supra note 5, at 112–15 (describing the background facts and trial of Moore v. 
Dempsey, a case where black defendants argued that their due process rights were infringed by an all-
white jury pressured by roving white mob members). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A 
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 2007) (recounting the role of the NAACP in the 
protracted and contentious, off-and-on representation of the nine defendants in the Scottsboro cases); 
see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936) (recounting how black defendants’ 
confessions were obtained after they had been repeatedly whipped, beaten, and one, hung from a tree by 
a rope); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 312–16 (1997) (recounting the cases of the 
“Martinsville Seven,” black defendants all death-sentenced for the alleged rape of a white woman, in 
which black lawyers unsuccessfully pressed claims of a pattern of racial discrimination, with the LDF 
offering legal assistance on appeal). 
 12 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 50–66 (1994); GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012) (recounting the cases 
of four black men in a Florida community falsely accused of rape who were successfully defended by 
112:1637 (2018) McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes 
1641 
 There came a time when a more comprehensive opportunity to 
redress these criminal justice grievances presented itself. The moment was 
June of 1963. Nine years earlier, in 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren had 
announced Brown v. Board of Education, marking a profound break with 
eighty years of judicial betrayal of protections promised under the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.13 By the early 1960s, 
the Warren Court had also undertaken a “criminal law revolution,” 
extending one by one, to state criminal defendants, most of the Bill of 
Rights protections originally applicable only against federal actors.14 
It was during this springtime for civil rights and civil liberties claims 
that a newly appointed Justice, Arthur Goldberg, and his young law clerk, 
Alan Dershowitz, came forward in 1963 with an internal memorandum, 
circulated to other Justices, proposing that the Court should take up the 
question “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, the imposition of the 
death penalty is proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.”15 After cataloguing arguments as to why all 
capital punishment might violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, Goldberg’s memo focused on its use against those convicted of 
“sexual crimes which do not endanger life (e.g., rape),”16 noting “the well-
recognized disparity in the imposition of the death penalty for sexual 
crimes committed by whites and nonwhites,” and citing statistics 
illustrating that between 1937 and 1951, 233 of the 259 defendants 
executed for rape in the United States were African-American.17 He urged 
the Court to order briefing and argument on all these issues.18 
Goldberg found, to his dismay, that a majority of the Justices were not 
eager to expand their docket to embrace this new cause. Indeed, Chief 
Justice Warren, Brown’s author, cautioned Goldberg prudentially that if he 
 
Marshall and Jack Greenberg despite rampant injustice, Ku Klux Klan violence, and personal danger to 
counsel); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS 
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 93–102 (1994) (same); id. at 256–59 (recounting 
unsuccessful last-minute attempts to save a black defendant from electrocution in Georgia, despite 
powerful evidence that he could not have committed the crime). 
 13 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A 
CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xii–xviii (2001); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 139–47 (3d ed. 1974). 
 14 See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 
31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. 
REV. 249 (1968). 
 15 Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term, 
1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 493 (1986); see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 76–78. 
 16 Goldberg, supra note 15, at 504. 
 17 Id. at 505 n.18. 
 18 Id. at 493, 499; see also MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 28–30 (1973). 
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did press the death penalty issue further, he should omit the issue of racial 
injustice.19 This theme of “racial avoidance” by the Court is one we shall 
see again.20 
Only partially deterred, Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices William 
O. Douglas and William Brennan, published a rare dissent in June of 1963 
from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in a “routine” rape case, 
Rudolph v. Alabama.21 Justice Goldberg’s dissent posed the questions 
whether, in light of the international and American trend against the 
imposition of death for rape, Arkansas’s continued use of the penalty 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency.”22 It 
read like an engraved invitation to resourceful counsel to build a trial 
record against rape as punishment and return to the Court, where the three 
dissenting Justices had already signaled their predisposition to entertain the 
claims favorably.23 
Nowhere was this invitation weighed more seriously than in the 
offices of the LDF. Despite a docket already overflowing with cases on 
school desegregation, college integration, and civil rights demonstrations, 
Jack Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall’s chosen successor as 
Director/Counsel of the LDF, charged several LDF staffers, including 
Michael Meltsner, Leroy Clark, and Frank Heffron, to begin exploring this 
 
 19 EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27–28 (2013). 
 20 See id. at 25–28. Mandery notes that Chief Justice Warren was keenly aware of the hostile 
political responses to Brown and widespread Southern defiance of its mandate for school integration, 
and suggests that Warren thought it would be imprudent for the Court to take on the death penalty, 
especially focusing on its racially discriminatory features during that period. “Ruling the death penalty 
unconstitutional would mean stepping in on behalf of black rapists and murderers. This would be more 
than the public could take.” Id. at 26; see also EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST 
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 88 (1998) (citing a 
secondhand account by Justice Douglas of Chief Justice Warren’s rationale); David C. Baldus, George 
Woodworth & Catherine M. Grosso, Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): 
Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143 
(2007) (naming and exploring this “denial and avoidance” strategy by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the United States Congress, and state legislatures and supreme courts); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan 
M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2015) 
(exploring the repeated occasions on which the Supreme Court has avoided addressing evidence of 
racial discrimination). 
 21 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 22 Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 23 Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier has observed that “the questions in the dissent sent out a message 
to capital defense attorneys across the country that at least some of the justices were open to 
constitutional arguments about the death penalty. . . . Justice Goldberg . . . hoped it would inspire 
lawyers to concentrate on bringing more challenges to the nation’s death penalty.” KIRCHMEIER, supra 
note 1, at 78. 
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possible new campaign.24 LDF was initially drawn toward this struggle not 
with the aim of abolishing capital punishment for its own sake, but because 
of its visibly racial misuse, a pattern Greenberg and LDF knew well.25 The 
story of the subsequent LDF-led campaign is a familiar one, oft retold, but I 
briefly recount it to underscore certain features that have significance for 
what ultimately transpired in McCleskey. 
Two crucial personnel decisions helped shape all that followed. The 
first was the recruitment into the effort of a young law professor, Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, among the very most brilliant, innovative, and selfless legal 
academics of the past half-century. Amsterdam, a summa cum laude 
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a rare non-
Harvard clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1962, had already gained near 
legendary status for his encyclopedic knowledge of federal law, his 
astonishing ability to spin out ingenious legal theories, his twenty-hour 
work days, and his unstinting devotion to civil liberties causes.26 Another 
Penn recruit was Professor Marvin Wolfgang, one of the most eminent and 
seasoned criminologists in the nation, who agreed to carry out an empirical 
study to probe the rape claim.27 
Together, Wolfgang, Amsterdam, and their LDF colleagues began to 
plan what was, for that day, a sophisticated empirical study of the 
imposition of capital sentences for the crime of rape. They decided to draw 
a scientific sample from the 3,000 capital rape cases that had been 
prosecuted in eleven Southern states between 1945 and 1965. They were 
keenly aware that simply demonstrating raw disparities between the 
number of black and white rape defendants on the one hand, and the 
number of black and white death sentences on the other, would not suffice 
to sustain a constitutional challenge, since prosecutors would surely 
contend that factors other than race itself actually explained the apparent 
racial disparities. Wolfgang therefore designed a questionnaire to gather 
data on twenty-nine important aspects of each case.28 In the summer of 
1965, amid the regional violence and tumult of that bloody civil rights era, 
Wolfgang sent forth young data collectors to county courthouses in eleven 
 
 24 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 30–31. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 440–42; 
TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 50–56. 
 25 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 35–36. 
 26 Id. at 79–86; BURTON H. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH ROW 230–32 (1973). 
 27 Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Racial Discrimination, Rape, and the Death Penalty, in 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 194, 194–97 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982). 
 28 Id. at 198–200; see also MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 75–78. 
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Southern states, charging them to search laboriously, file by file, for the 
necessary data on every sampled case.29 
Meanwhile, through a gradual process, LDF lawyers arrived at a series 
of ethical decisions that would shape the whole future of their 
representation in McCleskey and beyond. They could not know, for sure, in 
which particular case or cases Wolfgang’s evidence might eventually be 
presented. Unlike many civil “test cases,” in which counsel can select 
especially sympathetic plaintiffs to present their issues in the most 
favorable factual light, criminal cases frequently involve defendants 
charged with serious misdeeds who do not arouse sympathy of any kind. In 
these defense cases, moreover, trial and appellate courts are often disposed 
summarily to deny new constitutional claims and reluctant to entertain 
sophisticated social science evidence, especially in post-conviction 
proceedings filed long after the original criminal trials are over. In short, 
LDF lawyers would be hard-pressed to wait for just the right case in which 
to assert their constitutional claims. Instead, LDF eventually concluded that 
it needed to share whatever formal allegations of racial discrimination it 
could fashion with every single lawyer representing every single African-
American rape defendant, standing ready to go forward to a hearing 
whenever invited to do so by any interested judge. Such were the 
circumstances under which Warren McCleskey’s case would eventually 
become the vehicle for considering racial discrimination in Georgia’s post-
1972 capital statutes.30 
While racial disparities in capital sentencing were plainly what drew 
LDF into the rape-and-death-penalty struggle, moreover, LDF deemed it 
professionally unethical not to assert, on behalf of each such client, any 
other constitutional claims, whether racially based or not, that might save 
his or her life.31 Some fraction of those claims would be individual to each 
particular client’s case—how a defendant had been apprehended and 
questioned by police, whether evidence had been obtained illegally, or 
whether selection of the jury had violated constitutional norms. 
Yet by 1965, under Amsterdam’s guidance, LDF had begun to draw 
upon and expand ideas for a series of potentially broadly shared claims 
 
 29 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 86–87. 
 30 See Eric Muller, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting 
Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158, 177 (1985) (noting that “[t]he possibility of choosing 
an appealing litigant was a luxury which the planners of the capital punishment campaign could not 
enjoy,” and describing LDF’s capital clients as among “the most violent, ugly, and hated dropouts from 
American society”). 
 31 GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 442 (“For reasons related to our professional responsibility to our 
clients, . . . [w]e found that we couldn’t ethically limit ourselves to claims of racism if defendants had 
other good arguments . . . .”). 
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based on common procedural choices that most states had made about how 
to try capital cases. Among the most important were three later known as 
the “bifurcation” claim, the “sentencing guidelines” or “guided discretion” 
claim, and the “death qualification” claim. 
Most states required capital juries to resolve in a single proceeding 
both a defendant’s guilt and, if convicted, his or her sentence as well. Yet 
under this so-called “single verdict” approach, evidence that might weigh 
powerfully against imposition of a death sentence, such as a childhood 
marred by abuse and violence, might point toward a defendant’s possible 
guilt. The American Law Institute had recommended the reform of this 
system in 1959.32 Amsterdam framed that recommendation as a Due 
Process Clause challenge, arguing that states should not force defendants 
into a Hobson’s choice between presenting evidence that might save their 
lives or not presenting it in an effort to minimize the likelihood of their 
conviction. Instead, states should be required to structure bifurcated 
proceedings. In the first phase, juries would hear evidence and deliberate 
on guilt or innocence, with a second, separate sentencing phase to follow 
only if the defendant were convicted of capital murder.33 
Amsterdam’s examination of sentencing guidelines resulted in a 
similar new challenge. In most states, before juries deliberated on a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, trial judges routinely instructed the jurors in 
detail on law pertinent to each element of the crime and how they should 
weigh available evidence. Yet in marked contrast, judges allowed jurors to 
deliberate without any guidance at all on whether to impose a life or death 
sentence. This lack of any uniform “guided discretion” on the crucial issue 
of punishment, Amsterdam argued, also failed to meet due process 
standards.34 
The third broad claim looked neither to the structure of the 
proceedings nor to the guidance given jurors but to how those jurors were 
selected at the outset of the trial. In most states, prosecutors were allowed, 
during their pretrial voir dire examination of prospective jurors, 
automatically to exclude “for cause” all jurors who expressed any 
hesitation to impose a death sentence. Amsterdam posited that the 
wholesale removal of such jurors biased the jury’s deliberations at the guilt 
phase of the proceedings, by excusing jurors who could fairly decide the 
guilt–innocence issue (and who could indeed be shown to be less biased in 
favor of the State on various issues),35 and again at the penalty phase, by 
 
 32 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 91. 
 33 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 68–69. 
 34 Id. at 69–70. 
 35 Id. at 67–68. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1646 
excluding those who might vote for death in an especially egregious case 
but whose initial reluctance to do so represented an important part of the 
overall “conscience of the community” that should contribute to the jury’s 
recommendation on an appropriate sentence.36 
Lawyers at LDF agreed that each of these potentially lifesaving claims 
belonged in each capital rape case. Yet these claims seemed equally 
applicable to defendants at risk of a death sentence for murder, arson, or 
other felonies as well. Could LDF refuse to share its new theories with 
black clients facing execution for these other capital crimes? Indeed, could 
they restrict their potentially lifesaving theories only to African-American 
defendants? 
LDF’s answer to each of these questions was “no.”37 While LDF’s 
initial campaign had not aimed at abolition of death penalty statutes 
generally, through a process of ethical and strategic deduction, it eventually 
arrived at a principled approach that seemed to point toward the end, or at 
least the radical restructuring, of all state capital sentencing regimes. 
Moreover, LDF lawyers reasoned that since many of these issues might be 
employed by lawyers for white clients, it would be prudent as well as 
principled to become involved in all potential cases that might reach the 
Supreme Court.38 
Some tactical advantages supported such a decision. If LDF did 
manage to build a nationwide network of capital defense attorneys to 
defend every client under sentence of death, each of whom raised these 
new constitutional claims in state and federal post-conviction proceedings, 
proffering identical evidence and seeking final resolution by the Supreme 
Court, LDF foresaw that a “pileup on death row” might emerge. Such a de 
facto “moratorium” could elevate the public visibility of death penalty 
issues in every case. It might also put significant pressure on conscientious 
 
 36 The challenge to this practice eventually led to the Supreme Court’s important decision in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 37 See Muller, supra note 30, at 167–69 (suggesting that the original LDF race-focused goals of the 
campaign expanded as “the force of abolitionist logic . . . pushed the campaign far beyond its original 
scope”); see also MANDERY, supra note 19, at 49 (quoting LDF’s deputy director, James Nabrit, III, 
who explained that “[o]ur legal arguments created a lifeboat for people. Everybody was in the lifeboat, 
so LDF had an obligation to help them all”); MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 108 (quoting Amsterdam, 
who remarked that “[w]e could no more let men die that we had the power to save than we could have 
passed by a dying accident victim sprawled bloody and writhing on the road without stopping to render 
such aid as we could”). 
 38 GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 443 (observing that “[t]hese arguments against capital 
punishment could be made in the cases of whites as well as blacks. We knew that if we wanted to 
persuade the Supreme Court to make law, we needed to control every case possible . . . or some 
lawyer . . . who was perhaps not very competent might produce decisions that would tie our hands”); 
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 96. 
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judges, forcing them to decide claims in the awareness that their decisions 
might affect the fates of not one or two defendants, but many hundreds.39 
Yet this commitment to share potentially lifesaving constitutional 
claims with all capital inmates obviously came at a price. It took away key 
tools that experienced civil law reformers often employ to their advantage: 
to select a case with sympathetic clients and “favorable facts” and to file 
the case if possible before a favorably disposed judge. By contrast, LDF’s 
capital campaign would cede to any willing state or federal judge the 
opportunity to weigh complex empirical evidence and assess novel 
constitutional claims on behalf of any inmate who had pled LDF’s claims. 
In 1967, Amsterdam and LDF lawyers embarked on this never-before-
attempted effort to provide post-conviction assistance to every capital 
defendant, prompted in part by an announcement of Florida’s new 
governor, Claude Kirk, Jr., that he intended to begin executions for all of 
Florida’s nineteen inmates within a few weeks.40 Amsterdam, LDF staffer 
Jack Himmelstein, and others worked with legal allies in Florida and then 
California to obtain stays of execution in all pending capital cases.41 To do 
so, they prepared and circulated widely a “last aid” kit of papers: model 
constitutional claims and motions that would offer to provide evidence in 
support of each claim, ideally to be placed in the cases of every capitally 
sentenced defendant in America.42 LDF also held regional and statewide 
conferences to instruct willing volunteer attorneys in how to present such 
claims, and LDF agreed to stand, like a guarantor on a bank loan, as a 
backup source of help and counsel for any attorney called into court for a 
full post-conviction hearing on any of the claims. In effect, LDF’s original 
objective to challenge the racially disproportionate death sentencing of 
African-Americans for the crime of interracial rape became a nationwide 
campaign directed at the modern death penalty itself.43 
 
 39 MANDERY, supra note 19, at 65; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 106–07; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 
244–45. 
 40 WOLFE, supra note 26, at 230–38. 
 41 GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 443–46; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 229–43. 
 42 MANDERY, supra note 19, at 52; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 107–10; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 
244–46. 
 43 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 112–15. LDF was joined in this campaign at the national level by 
the ACLU, which, after internal debate, decided to take a public position against capital punishment and 
press its arguments, less in the courts than in legislative arenas and public forums. See KIRCHMEIER, 
supra note 1, at 80–81 (noting that some later mused that, had the money and energy directed into the 
litigation effort overseen by LDF been channeled instead into lobbying for legislative repeal, in an era 
when public opposition to the death penalty had grown large, capital punishment might have ended via 
this legislative route); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 250–
51 (2002) (same); Muller, supra note 30, at 175–80 (faulting LDF’s failure fully to consider the risky 
public relations dimensions of its capital representations). Despite the national-level division of labors 
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The next six years were fraught with legal and judicial drama. In the 
years from 1965 to 1971, some aspects of the campaign went according to 
plan, while others skewed wildly in unexpected directions. The moratorium 
strategy succeeded beyond expectations: despite a flow of new capital 
convictions and death sentences in some forty-one states, the last execution 
carried out in any American jurisdiction occurred in Colorado in 1967.44 
Virtually every other death-sentenced inmate was protected by pleadings 
filed in some state or federal court that asserted one or more of the LDF 
issues.45 Many counsel persuaded local judges, moreover, that they should 
hold those issues in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
disposition in “some other case.” Scores of state and federal judges, hard-
pressed for time, proved frequently quite willing to let these difficult 
habeas cases sink toward the bottom of their busy dockets.46 The pileup of 
death-sentenced inmates awaiting execution gradually grew to 435 by 1967 
and to over 620 by 1972.47 
Meanwhile, of great significance for the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
treatment of racial discrimination claims in capital cases, Professor 
Wolfgang’s study results began to come in. The data revealed that black 
defendants in his survey were indeed nearly seven times more likely to 
receive a death sentence than white defendants (13% vs. 2%), a rate that 
rose to eighteen times as many death sentences when the defendant was 
black and the victim was white (36% vs. 2%).48 Significantly, these wide 
racial disparities did not diminish when Wolfgang carried out multiple 
 
between LDF and the ACLU, some of the most vigorous statewide efforts involved state ACLU 
branches in Georgia, Florida, California, and elsewhere. WOLFE, supra note 26, at 230–42. 
 44 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 81–82; see also Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and 
Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 24, 25 tbl.1-3 (titled “Prisoners 
Executed Under Civil Authority in the United States, 1930–1980”). 
 45 WOLFE, supra note 26, at 309–10. 
 46 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 92. 
 47 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 81–82; Hugo Adam Bedau, The Laws, the Crimes, and the 
Executions, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 63 tbl.2-3-4 (titled “Prisoners on 
Death Row by Year, Race, and Sex, 1968–80” and reporting that 642 inmates were awaiting execution 
at the close of the year 1971). 
 48 Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 27, at 200–01. David Baldus later summarized the study’s design 
as follows: 
Wolfgang’s data set included information on a wide variety of legitimate case characteristics. 
Indeed, in terms of the number of legitimate background variables for which data were available, 
his was the most sophisticated empirical investigation of sentencing yet conducted at that time. 
The data allowed Wolfgang to control one at a time for over two dozen variables (such as prior 
record, contemporaneous robbery, weapon, and victims’ age). . . . Wolfgang found that adjusting 
for none of these legitimate background variables reduced the strong race effects initially 
observed. 
DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 250–51 (1990). 
112:1637 (2018) McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes 
1649 
regression analyses to test whether race-neutral factors or others among the 
twenty-nine variables in each case might actually be driving the 
differences.49 
An Arkansas federal district judge eventually agreed to hear these 
racial claims. Amsterdam and LDF counsel presented Dr. Wolfgang and 
his data on behalf of death-sentenced inmate William Maxwell.50 Following 
the hearing, first the district court51 and then the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion authored by then-Circuit 
Judge Harry Blackmun,52 rejected Maxwell’s racial claim for several 
reasons. First, despite the statistical significance of Wolfgang’s overall 
racial patterns, Maxwell’s case had arisen, by chance, in an Arkansas 
county that was not part of Wolfgang’s sample, so there was no direct 
evidence comparing what prosecutors and juries in Maxwell’s own county 
had done in other rape cases.53 Second, Blackmun noted that Wolfgang had 
not collected data on additional factors about each crime that might 
conceivably have affected the sentencing outcomes.54 Finally, Wolfgang’s 
sample of death-sentenced Arkansas cases similar to Maxwell’s included 
only fifty-five cases, too few to reach scientifically reliable answers.55 
Blackmun famously concluded: “We are not certain that, for Maxwell, 
statistics will ever be his redemption.”56 
LDF subsequently filed a comprehensive petition for certiorari with 
the Supreme Court, its ultimate target all along, raising Maxwell’s racial 
claim as well as LDF’s claims about the absence of a bifurcated 
proceeding, the lack of any sentencing guidance for the jury, and a jury 
 
 49 Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 27, at 201–04; see also id. at 204 (noting that “[w]hether or not a 
contemporaneous offense has been committed, if the defendant is black and the victim is white, the 
defendant is about eighteen times more likely to receive the death penalty than when the defendant is in 
any other racial combination of defendant and victim”). The researchers added: 
Over two dozen possibly aggravating nonracial variable that might have accounted for the higher 
proportion of blacks than whites sentenced to death upon conviction of rape have been analyzed. 
Not one of these nonracial factors has withstood the tests of statistical significance. . . . This is a 
striking conclusion. . . . All the nonracial factors in each of the states analyzed “wash out,” that is, 
they have no bearing on the imposition of the death penalty in disproportionate numbers upon 
blacks. The only variable of statistical significance that remains is race. 
Id.; see also Marvin E. Wolfgang, Blacks and the Law, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119 
(1973) (further describing his study). 
 50 GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 444–45 (describing testimony in the district court hearing). 
 51 Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966). 
 52 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 103–05; WOLFE, 
supra note 26, at 284–86. 
 53 Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 146. 
 54 Id. at 147. 
 55 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 94–102. 
 56 Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 148. 
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selection process that excluded jurors hesitant about the death penalty. 
Strikingly, the Court agreed to grant review and hear all these issues except 
Maxwell’s racial claim, a claim the liberal Warren Court went out of its 
way not to entertain, despite the presentation in the case of the full 
Wolfgang study, tested in trial litigation.57 
After Maxwell v. Bishop was argued in March of 1969,58 an initial 
internal vote showed the Justices ready, by an eight-to-one margin, to strike 
down Maxwell’s sentence on one of the broad due process grounds.59 Yet 
the apparent consensus was a shaky one, since some Justices apparently 
preferred the bifurcation issue, while others found the guided-sentencing-
discretion issue more compelling. When Justice Douglas tried to draft an 
opinion that embraced both issues, he failed to attract five votes for his 
efforts.60 
In the meantime, the Court’s membership was about to undergo 
seismic change. Chief Justice Earl Warren had announced in the spring of 
1968 that he would step down at the end of the following Term. Moreover, 
Abe Fortas—who had succeeded Arthur Goldberg and whom President 
Johnson hoped to name the new Chief Justice as Warren’s replacement—
first found his nomination to become Chief Justice stalled in the Senate in 
the fall of 1968 and then found himself accused of financial misconduct the 
following spring, prompting his resignation from the Court on May 14, 
1969.61 
These events took place in the immediate aftermath of a tumultuous 
presidential election in which the country had chosen former Republican 
Vice President Richard Nixon over the Democratic Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey. Nixon had campaigned vigorously in 1968 on a “law and 
order” platform,62 and he soon fulfilled that promise by replacing Chief 
Justice Warren with the far more conservative Warren Burger, who had 
earlier, as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, clashed with more liberal judges over criminal law 
 
 57 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 148. 
 58 See id. at 158–67 (providing a summary of the arguments by Anthony G. Amsterdam and Albert 
W. Harris, Jr. in Maxwell). 
 59 LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 63, 339 n.71 
(1992); MANDERY, supra note 19, at 83. 
 60 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 84; MANDERY, supra note 19, at 83–84, 89. 
 61 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 100; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 186. 
 62 See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime 
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–16 (2013) (discussing Nixon’s 1968 strategy emphasizing the need for 
public safety as a rationale for his law and order promises). 
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issues.63 President Nixon then replaced liberal Abe Fortas with Harry 
Blackmun, the very Eighth Circuit judge who had rejected Maxwell’s 
claims.64 
Suddenly, neither of the due process issues in Maxwell’s case 
commanded a majority. The Court instead ordered reargument for May 4, 
1970, and eventually reversed Maxwell’s death sentence on a narrower, 
death-qualification ground, making no new constitutional law.65 The Court 
then took two death cases, McGautha v. California66 and Crampton v. 
Ohio,67 which had been litigated by non-LDF attorneys, to consider the due 
process issues unresolved in Maxwell itself. In 1971, Justice John Harlan, 
writing for six Justices in McGautha, declared that the Due Process Clause 
did not constitutionally compel states to accept LDF’s long-pursued 
guided-discretion approach. His coolly analytic decision asked instead 
whether any comprehensive standards for classifying the death-worthiness 
of each case could ever be developed.68 He likewise found no constitutional 
obligation for states to conduct bifurcated proceedings.69 It appeared the 
breakthrough moment for LDF’s constitutional campaign had come and 
gone. 
Indeed, the 1970s appeared to have ushered in an autumnal chill for 
every aspect of the LDF campaign.70 Not only had core liberal members of 
the reform-minded Warren Court been replaced by a cohort of more 
conservative Justices, but the country itself had moved in a notably more 
conservative direction. The widespread optimism of the early Kennedy 
years had largely vanished after the assassinations of John Kennedy, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, the urban riots of the mid-to-late 
 
 63 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 102. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per curiam); KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 84; see 
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 95–96; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 199–211; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 
303–04. 
 66 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 67 Id. (stating that the Court heard Crampton together with McGautha). 
 68 Id. at 204 (“To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their 
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can 
be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond 
present human ability.”); see MANDERY, supra note 19, at 107–11; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 240–
42. 
 69 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 210 (“To say that the two-stage jury trial . . . is probably the fairest, as 
some commentators and courts have suggested, and with which we might well agree were the matter 
before us in a legislative or rulemaking context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination that this 
method of handling the problem is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). The 
Court’s treatment here has been brilliantly analyzed by Professor Robert Weisberg. Robert Weisberg, 
Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305. 
 70 MANDERY, supra note 19, at 111–14. 
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1960s, and the relentless war in Vietnam.71 Crime, including homicide, had 
begun to climb, and popular support for the death penalty had increased.72 
President Nixon and his Attorney General John Mitchell repeatedly 
asserted that federal judges and the Supreme Court should engage in “strict 
construction” of the Constitution and nothing beyond.73 Before the end of 
1972, President Nixon would remake the Supreme Court with his third and 
fourth nominations, replacing the retiring Justices Black and Harlan with 
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, both of them strongly skeptical 
about any judicial role in restricting the latitude of state criminal 
proceedings.74 
Yet, to the surprise of many, despite these adverse changes in both 
Court personnel and the public mood, in 1972, in four capital cases that 
included Furman v. Georgia,75 the Supreme Court finally gave LDF and 
Amsterdam the broad victory they had sought for eight years—vacating not 
just the death sentences of the four defendants before the Court, but every 
death sentence, and every death penalty statute, in every American 
jurisdiction.76 Although LDF’s Due Process Clause challenges had been 
rejected in McGautha a term earlier, the Court invited new argument on the 
question whether the “imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in 
(these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?”77 
LDF’s Director/Counsel Jack Greenberg and Anthony Amsterdam 
presented the arguments for the defendants. Greenberg, who represented 
the defendants in the two rape cases, made passing use of the Wolfgang 
evidence of racial bias to emphasize that death for rape was a penalty used 
primarily in the South against black defendants and was therefore 
“unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.78 Amsterdam embroidered an 
elaborate Eighth Amendment theme, pressing the idea that while the 
Constitutional text expressly recognized, and thus implicitly approved, 
 
 71 See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969). 
 72 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 92–93. 
 73 See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 383, 419, 430 (2000). 
 74 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 86; LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 104–05. 
 75 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). The other three cases were Aikens v. California, Branch v. Texas, and 
Jackson v. Georgia. The Court heard Furman together with Branch and Jackson, while hearing Aikens 
separately. See Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972). All four cases involved African-American 
defendants convicted for crimes against white victims. Aikens and Furman had been convicted of 
murder, Branch and Jackson, of rape. MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 246. 
 76 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 89. A total of 589 prisoners were spared execution by the Court’s 
decision. 
 77 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239. 
 78 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 268, 275–77. 
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governmental use of the death penalty, capital punishment had since 
become an atavism, a relic of an earlier age, a penalty no longer supported 
or regularly applied.79 His intertwined theme, enlarging on the first, was 
that those death sentences still being imposed were being meted out in a 
handful of arbitrary, capriciously chosen cases that made its imposition 
“freakish” and “unusual,” violating core Eighth Amendment principles.80 
Justice Byron White later remarked to a colleague after Amsterdam’s 
argument in Furman that he had “never seen a better oral advocate.”81 
The Court proved deeply divided; although it struck down the death 
penalties in every case before it, the Court split five to four, with each of 
the nine Justices writing separately to produce the longest set of opinions in 
one case in the Court’s history.82 The five opinions of the majority Justices 
varied in rationale. Justices Douglas, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood 
Marshall all acknowledged in passing that racial minorities and the poor 
bore the heaviest burden of death sentencing,83 but most of the Justices 
chose not to reflect at all on the penalty’s racial effects. Two key short 
decisions authored by Justices White and Stewart relied principally on the 
penalty’s freakishness and unusualness. The death penalty, Justice White 
added, was used so seldom that it no longer served either of its chief 
penological justifications—neither deterrence nor retribution.84 Notably for 
our later discussion of McCleskey, Justice Lewis Powell, new to the Court 
in 1972, wrote by far the longest and most passionate dissent in Furman; it 
ran to more than fifty printed pages. Powell devoted several pages to 
parrying claims that racial disparities infected capital sentencing in 1972, 
attributing such evidence either to past practices now largely abandoned or 
to the ostensible fact that “[t]he ‘have-nots’ in every society always have 
been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints 
than their more affluent fellow citizens.”85 
 
 79 See Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, Aikens, 406 U.S. 813 (No. 68-5027), 1971 WL 134168, at *15–
18. 
 80 Id. at 49–55; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 269–70; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 378. 
 81 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 114. 
 82 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 220 
(1979) (observing that “[t]he nine separate opinions totaled 50,000 words, 243 pages—the longest 
decision in the Court’s history”). 
 83 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–52, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364–66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 84 Id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring). 
 85 Id. at 414, 447–50 (Powell, J., dissenting). Woodward and Armstrong report that Justice Powell 
acknowledged that “[b]lacks probably had been discriminated against and more often given death 
sentences, just as they had been discriminated against in every other way. But these were things of the 
past.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 214. Powell apparently assumed such injustices 
were unlikely to persist, because of the increased presence of black jurors on capital juries and the 
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Death row inmates and lawyers at LDF could celebrate their 
remarkable victory only for a short time,86 since a broad public backlash 
against Furman was powerful and immediate. Amsterdam had assured the 
Justices that capital punishment was a leftover relic of an earlier day. Yet 
fierce public outcry against the decision and prompt reenactment of capital 
statutes by thirty-five state legislatures appeared to show that the penalty 
remained important to many citizens and their representatives.87 The Court 
and the abolitionist forces came in for broad criticism, not only from state 
and local executive and legislative leaders, but eventually from President 
Gerald Ford’s Solicitor General, Robert Bork, who weighed in aggressively 
in support of states defending against death penalty challenges.88 
State attorneys general and legislators, however determined they may 
have been to reenact capital statutes, nonetheless poured over the language 
and logic of Furman. In consequence, virtually every state adopted one or 
more of the procedural reforms that had been pressed by LDF through the 
late 1960s. Roughly half chose both to bifurcate all death cases and to 
legislate a roster of “aggravating” and “mitigating” factors that could guide 
the discretion of their capital juries.89 
A second wave of constitutional challenges to these new statutes was 
inevitable, and the battle was joined in cases from five states: Georgia, 
Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina. While LDF’s constitutional 
attacks came from several directions, its chief contentions reiterated its 
claim in Furman that capital punishment inevitably violated the Eighth 
Amendment. In the alternative, LDF argued that even if the evenhanded 
application of the penalty was theoretically possible, these new state 
procedures were not actually working to curb arbitrariness in practice; 
 
Warren Court’s expansion of other criminal procedural protections—protections that could be deployed 
to rectify individual instances of discrimination without the need to strike all death sentences. Id. 
 Indeed, while rejecting the petitioner’s argument to invalidate all capital sentences under the Eighth 
Amendment, Powell’s opinion ironically invoked the Wolfgang study to suggest a possible equal 
protection avenue, suggesting that “Maxwell does point the way to a means of raising the equal 
protection challenge that is more consonant with precedent and the Constitution’s mandates than the 
several courses pursued by today’s concurring opinions.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). Time was to test, of course, whether Justice Powell, when faced with a far more 
thoroughgoing statistical showing of discrimination than Wolfgang’s, would actually apply an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis to redress proven discrimination in capital sentencing. 
 86 MANDERY, supra note 19, at 239–41 (recounting Amsterdam’s immense personal sense of relief 
when learning that his many clients had been spared from death, and likewise, the LDF capital 
punishment staff’s late-night celebration, elatedly chanting out, one by one, the names of their clients). 
 87 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 111. 
 88 Id. at 114; see EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 59, at 97–98; MANDERY, supra note 19, at 247–
58. 
 89 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982, at 
194–95 (1974); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 111–12. 
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instead, they merely papered it over with high-sounding but ineffective 
procedures that still allowed unchecked discretion.90 
The Supreme Court’s eventual decisions in these five cases in 1976 
represented a major defeat for LDF and its allies. The decisions indeed set 
the constitutional foundation for all capital sentencing litigation that has 
followed. In a set of three-Justice plurality opinions coauthored by Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and John Paul Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia,91 Proffitt v. 
Florida,92 and Jurek v. Texas,93 and a second set authored by Justice White 
for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist, the Court first 
decided that the Eighth Amendment did not forbid use of the death penalty 
under all circumstances.94 It then carefully examined the specific 
procedures each state had put in place since 1973 and concluded that each 
appeared to satisfy the core constitutional concerns that had prompted the 
Court’s decision in Furman four years earlier.95 
In the years following its 1976 decisions, the Court decided, favorably 
to capital defendants, a number of additional cases that gradually 
circumscribed state sentencing authority along two dimensions. First, the 
Court repeatedly took steps to limit the kinds of crimes for which death 
could be imposed and the defendants who could be charged capitally.96 
Second, it refined and augmented the requisite procedural requirements 
necessary to assure “super due process” in capital sentencing.97 Pertinent to 
 
 90 EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 59, at 102–03; KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 97. Amsterdam’s 
“intense moral and emotional commitment” apparently did not play nearly so well during the 1976 oral 
arguments as they had in Furman. When the Court tested his argument by wondering whether the 
commandant at Buchenwald, or an airline terrorist, or the perpetrator of a hydrogen explosion in New 
York City might be executed, Amsterdam repeatedly replied in the negative. Several Justices found his 
inflexibility on this point “self-righteous.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 433–34. One 
Justice reportedly commented in exasperation, “Now I know what it’s like to hear Jesus Christ.” 
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 114. 
 91 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 92 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 93 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 94 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–87. 
 95 Id. at 187–206; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247–60; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268–77. The Court did decide, 
however, to strike the capital statutes of the states of North Carolina and Louisiana, which had proposed 
to eliminate arbitrariness by automatically imposing death sentences on all defendants convicted of any 
capital crime. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
 96 DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION 270–71 (2010) (noting the Court’s series of post-Gregg decisions that eventually forbade 
the death penalty for rapists, robbers, the insane, the mentally infirm, and juvenile offenders). 
 97 Id. at 263–67 (noting that, in addition to narrowing the categories of defendants constitutionally 
eligible for death, the Court engaged in the “juridification” of certain additional capital sentencing 
procedures between 1976 and the mid-1980s, in such decisions as: Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 
(1977) (forbidding a Florida judge to impose a death sentence based on evidence contained in a pre-
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our later consideration of McCleskey, one of the Court’s first post-1976 
decisions came in 1977 in Coker v. Georgia,98 where the Court finally took 
up the issue of the death penalty as punishment for rape. Rape was, of 
course, the very crime, and death, the very punishment, that had originally 
impelled LDF’s death penalty campaign. Yet strikingly, neither Justice 
White’s opinion for four Justices, nor any of the concurring or dissenting 
opinions in Coker, ever mentioned race, the Wolfgang evidence, or the 
nation’s broader history of discrimination in rape cases at all. Instead, 
White rested his decision upon the principle that death was constitutionally 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment for a crime that did not 
extinguish life.99 Once again, the Court chose not to confront the systematic 
racial disparities, even in rape cases where wide and persistent racial 
disparities had long been the punishment’s most distinguishing feature. 
Amsterdam responded to the constitutional defeat in the 1976 cases 
with a self-enforced period of contemplation of the various decisions 
rendered by the Court. He returned to the fray within a few weeks, armed 
with a new packet of more than one-hundred legal-sized pages. Each page 
designated some possible claim he found lurking in the interstices of the 
Court’s decisions in Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson, and Roberts. For 
each possible new claim, Amsterdam recited constitutional authority, 
drawn from language in the 1976 cases or from earlier decisions of the 
Court that could fortify the argument, then assessed the strength of the 
claim, offered tactical considerations, and added a summary description of 
all evidence needed to substantiate the claim. Affectionately known by 
LDF staffers as “the ridiculous memo,” this one-hundred-plus-page 
document guided much of LDF’s capital work for the coming decade.100 
Prominent among the new claims remained LDF’s lodestar: challenges to 
capital sentencing regimes for arbitrariness and racial discrimination in 
practice. 
My own connections with LDF began in the summer of 1976, when I 
volunteered to work with a seasoned partner in my New York law firm to 
represent Jerry Jurek—Texas’s “named defendant” in the 1976 case—as 
 
sentencing report that the defendant had no state right to confront and rebut); Green v. Georgia, 
442 U.S. 95 (1979) (insisting that a capital defendant must be allowed to proffer mitigating evidence in 
a capital sentencing proceeding, even if otherwise violative of a state hearsay rule); Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420 (1980) (striking a Georgia aggravating circumstance as too vague and amorphous); and 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (faulting Florida’s procedures for determining whether a 
condemned inmate was insane and, therefore, ineligible to be executed), before the Court began to turn 
away from these ameliorative procedural requirements in the following decade)). 
 98 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 99 Id. at 597–600. 
 100 MANDERY, supra note 19, at 426–27. 
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his case moved into state and federal post-conviction proceedings. Eighteen 
months later, in January of 1978, I joined LDF full time as its most junior 
capital punishment attorney, overseen by Jack Greenberg, three more 
senior LDF attorneys, and Anthony Amsterdam, who became a mentor for 
the subsequent twelve years. 
LDF concentrated some of its energies in 1977 and 1978 on knitting 
together a revived national network of volunteer counsel for every death-
sentenced inmate and litigating other post-Gregg issues. Yet the question 
whether capital statutes were discriminatory and arbitrary never left LDF’s 
agenda. Various eminent social scientists had already begun analyzing 
homicide data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports files to see whether 
racial factors appeared to be playing an impermissible role in post-Furman 
capital sentencing.101 And in 1979, David Baldus, a law professor at the 
University of Iowa and a coauthor of a highly respected text on the use of 
statistics in proving discrimination,102 began a National Institute of Justice-
funded, before-and-after study of 156 pre-Furman death cases and 594 
post-Furman cases in Georgia, modeling two decision points: prosecutorial 
decisions on whether to move murder convictions to a sentencing phase, 
and jury decisions on whether to impose a life or a death sentence. This 
Procedural Reform Study, as Baldus named it, was by far the most 
ambitious post-Furman study to that point.103 
Meanwhile, Jack Greenberg, LDF’s Director/Counsel, had gone 
searching for a generous funder who might provide major support for a 
state-of-the-art empirical study of post-Furman capital sentencing. Once he 
obtained the then-huge $250,000 commitment from the Edna McConnell 
Clark Foundation, LDF turned to the selection of an appropriate expert.104 I 
was only minimally involved in the decision to choose David Baldus, but I 
recall early meetings between Baldus, Greenberg, Amsterdam, and other 
 
 101 See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35–105 (1989); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, 
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 590–91 
(1980); Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 789 (1981); Michael 
L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 918 
(1981); Marc Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the 
Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMP. L. Q. 261, 282–85 
(1976); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 458–59 (1981). 
 102 DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980). 
 103 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 42–44 (1990). 
 104 David Baldus et al., McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Denial, Avoidance, and the Legitimization of 
Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 229, 
246 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009); see also LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 167. 
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LDF staffers (for I had volunteered to serve as LDF’s social science 
liaison—one of the best poorly-thought-out decisions I ever made) and I 
soon became immersed in the ongoing effort. 
LDF’s agreement with Baldus was simple and straightforward: he 
would conduct a major study of capital sentencing in some Southern state, 
using Clark Foundation funds to meet the expenses of the research. If 
Baldus found no discrimination, he would be free to publish his findings 
wherever he chose. If he did chance to find discrimination however, he 
would share his findings and agree to testify for LDF in some capital 
proceeding.105 Baldus was honest and forthright from the outset: he 
candidly stated that he did not believe he would find substantial 
discrimination by race. He surmised that between the various criminal 
procedure reforms approved by the Supreme Court and the ongoing civil 
rights progress being made in the South, capital charging and sentencing 
decisions had probably become evenhanded. Lawyers at LDF were pleased 
with Baldus’s initial stance; it seemed far wiser to solicit data and analysis 
from a conscientious social scientist initially skeptical of the racial 
hypothesis than to retain someone predisposed from the outset to credit it. 
The design of the study was crucially important to all parties. LDF 
had long suspected that any continuing discrimination might well manifest 
itself not at the penalty phase, where Baldus’s Procedural Reform Study 
had focused, but at earlier stages of capital prosecutions: a prosecutor’s 
choice to charge a homicide as murder rather than some lesser offense; a 
prosecutor’s refusal to accept a plea of guilty in exchange for a 
commitment not to press for a death sentence; or a jury’s choice to convict 
for murder rather than for a lesser included offense. Baldus was quite 
willing to obtain evidence on decisions made at each of these stages.106 He 
was also eager to expand his already large roster of variables to include 
every possible factor bearing on a prosecutorial or jury decision that could 
be suggested by any cooperative prosecutor, judge, or defense attorney, 
including variables designed to capture the “strength of the evidence” in 
each case.107 Baldus and his colleagues ultimately designed a revised and 
much-expanded questionnaire for the study with over 400 variables.108 They 
then drew a stratified sample of 1,066 cases from all 2,484 Georgia cases, 
within the 1973–1979 period, in which a defendant had been arrested, 
 
 105 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 44, 310. 
 106 Id. at 45. 
 107 Id. at 45–46. 
 108 Id. at 512–48 (setting forth the Charging and Sentencing Study questionnaire). 
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charged with homicide, and later convicted either of murder or of voluntary 
manslaughter.109 
Georgia was chosen as the state for further inquiry for several 
principal reasons. By far the most important was the unique access Georgia 
afforded to necessary data. Unlike most other states, where collecting data 
required extended field trips to scores of county courthouses, Georgia had 
already done most of the collection work itself, for Georgia operated a 
system under which its Board of Pardons and Paroles already gathered the 
criminal files on every prisoner incarcerated anywhere within the system. 
The board’s offices in Atlanta therefore contained a treasure trove of data, 
including actual police reports, witness statements taken by police or 
prosecutors, and prosecutors’ notes, in addition to formal documents such 
as indictments, judgments, and the like.110 A trained group of law students, 
overseen by an experienced graduate data collector, gathered the data for 
Baldus in the summer of 1981, working principally from Pardon & Parole 
Board files.111 
Beyond his rich intellectual gifts, four interrelated characteristics 
shaped David Baldus’s work: scrupulous honesty; a deep knowledge of 
statistical and methodological alternatives; a readiness to test, reexamine, 
and vary all of his methods and assumptions; and an indefatigable 
commitment to take every step necessary to assure the integrity of his own 
work. Throughout the litigation, Baldus repeatedly showed himself willing 
to question his overall design, accept any reasonable coding or modeling 
suggestions, and retest all alternative hypotheses that might explain his 
tentative conclusions.112 
 
 109 Id. at 45, 67 n.10 (describing the sampling methods and choices). 
 110 Id. at 310. 
 111 Id. at 46. During the oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice White attempted to make 
an issue of qualifications of the data gatherers, noting they were merely “law students, as opposed to 
law graduates.” LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 202–03. In fact, the data project overseer, Edward Gates, 
was a law graduate and experienced empiricist who had earlier collected data for Baldus’s Procedural 
Reform Study and still earlier, for cancer research at Yale. He and Professor Baldus had personally 
selected the law student coders through a competitive process and then trained them on scene at the 
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Gates remained throughout the summer, offering both personal 
oversight and a written protocol designed to instruct the coders on any matters of ambiguity. Gates 
regularly double-checked their work by instructing the coders who had completed a file to switch files 
randomly with another coder, to recode, and then compare the coding of each coder so as to assure 
uniformity. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 452. 
 112 See Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of McCleskey v. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1905, 1924 (2012) (noting that “Baldus’s achievement in McCleskey is as much as anything a testament 
to his character—that of a tireless, selfless, passionate, inquisitive scientist”); id. at 1911 (contrasting 
Baldus’s exemplary research approach—“Why not find out everything about every case?”—with that of 
other fine researchers); see also BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 323 (describing Baldus’s willingness, 
during the federal hearing, to accept a predictive, death-sentencing model proposed by the federal judge 
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The Georgia coding went forward in Atlanta during the summer of 
1981; Baldus and Woodward carried out their data entry, cleaning, and 
initial analysis over the winter and spring of 1982.113 In the meantime, LDF 
was advising lawyers throughout the State of Georgia to be sure to plead 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment discrimination and arbitrariness claims 
in all of their capital cases and to request evidentiary hearings to 
demonstrate these disparities.114 
Late in May of 1982, Professor Baldus telephoned me to share big 
news: his still-preliminary first data analyses revealed, to his surprise, that 
racial factors were indeed still playing an important role in Georgia’s 
capital sentencing system. Most salient were the race-of-victim disparities 
he found. While African-American defendants had received death 
sentences in 22% of cases in which their murder victims had been white, 
only 8% of white defendant/white victim cases led to death sentences, and 
only 1% of black defendant/black victim cases. Multiple regression 
analyses performed using different combinations of possibly relevant 
alternative factors and varied statistical techniques failed to shake these 
racially disparate outcomes.115 
At that time, I was serving as LDF’s liaison to Georgia’s capital 
defense attorneys, working directly with the state’s active ACLU branch 
and other Georgia nonprofit legal organizations.116 Following LDF’s long-
standing policies, I let each of them know about Baldus’s research results. 
One Atlanta attorney, Robert Stroup, called to say that he was then 
representing an inmate whose federal habeas petition had just been denied 
by a federal district judge. Without hesitation, we prepared a motion to 
reopen the case under Federal Rule 60(b)(2), alleging that Baldus’s recent 
findings constituted “newly available evidence.” The federal district judge, 
J. Owen Forrester agreed to grant our motion and direct a hearing. The 
inmate’s name was Warren McCleskey.117 
 
and then reanalyze his Georgia data employing the judge’s model—an experiment that yielded racial 
disparities in Georgia cases equal to, and even somewhat greater than, those reported using Baldus’s 
own models). 
 113 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 310. 
 114 Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 247. 
 115 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 310. 
 116 In addition to an active state ACLU branch, led by attorney George Kendall and death penalty 
coordinator, Patsy Morris, who charted the progress of every capital case, Georgia was blessed with the 
presence of the Southern Prisoners’ Defense Committee (later renamed the Southern Center for Human 
Rights), led by Steve Bright, the Team Defense Project, led by Millard Farmer, the Southern Regional 
Office of the ACLU, and a network of fine and dedicated public defenders and private volunteer 
counsel. 
 117 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 184–85; Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 247–48. 
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The Court allowed just over a year for the parties to exchange 
documents and carry out depositions of Baldus and the State’s expert 
witnesses. In August of 1983, Judge Forrester heard the matter over a 
period of eight days. Our challenge was how best to present Professor 
Baldus’s sophisticated study, which by then had been expanded to include 
dozens of overlapping analyses (cross-tabulations, ordinary least squares 
regressions, logistical regressions, stepwise regressions, and qualitative 
comparisons using vignettes) carried out in a huge variety of ways (from 
parsimonious eight- or nine-factor models to a 230-variable model, with 
dozens of alternatives in between). The choice was not among which 
models to employ and defend, since virtually all models, even the huge 
230-variable model, showed race-of-victim effects that achieved statistical 
significance at a .01 level or greater.118 The challenge was to emphasize 
why this uniformity of racial findings across all of Baldus’s multiplicity of 
alternative analyses was such a great strength of his study, without 
somehow allowing our description of the various technical alternatives to 
create overload or confusion.119 
At the hearing, once I had presented Professors Baldus and George 
Woodworth, my co-counsel Timothy Ford, an Amsterdam protégé and 
longtime LDF cooperating attorney, presented Professor Richard Berk of 
the University of California at Santa Barbara, who had previously 
conducted a review of modern criminal sentencing research for the 
National Academy of Sciences, to assess Baldus’s work. Berk testified to 
the outstanding quality and reliability of the Baldus studies and rendered an 
unqualifiedly positive assessment: “[T]his is far and away the most 
complete and thorough analysis of sentencing that’s been done. I mean 
there’s nothing even close.”120 
The State took an extremely defensive posture throughout the hearing. 
It offered no alternative data analysis at all. Instead, it made three basic 
 
 118 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 317–18 tbl.51. 
 119 Baldus thoroughly described this statistical presentation in his subsequent book. Id. at 311–39. 
 120 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Johnson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Richard Berk’s assessment). Professor Welsh White likewise 
described the Baldus study as “the most exhaustive study of racial discrimination in capital sentencing 
that has ever been conducted.” WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 128 (1987). In 1990, the United 
States General Accounting Office published an analysis of twenty-eight studies and acknowledged a 
pattern of racial disparities in capital charging and sentencing by race. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 
5–6 (1990) (“To summarize, the synthesis supports a strong race of victim influence. The race of 
offender influence is not as clear cut and varies across a number of dimensions. Although there are 
limitations to the studies’ methodologies, they are of sufficient quality to support the synthesis 
findings.”). 
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arguments in avoidance: first, that Baldus’s data was so dirty and unreliable 
that no results could be relied on; second, that black-victim cases as a 
whole were different, and usually less aggravated, than white-victim cases; 
and third, that, in any event, every capital case was so unique, and the 
relevant considerations so vast in number, that no meaningful comparisons 
were possible. LDF’s response to the first objection noted that Baldus had 
drawn his data directly from Georgia police and prosecutors’ working files. 
These Georgia officials had plainly considered their own files sufficiently 
reliable to use them as a basis for making their life or death charging and 
sentencing decisions. Addressing the State’s hypothesis that Georgia’s 
black-victim homicides were, on the whole, less aggravated than white-
victim cases, Baldus responded that the State’s observation missed the 
point. The key question was whether black-victim cases and white-victim 
cases at similar levels of aggravation were being treated similarly. The data 
showed they were not.121 
Finally, the State’s assertion that each capital case was unique and 
incomparable could not begin to account for Baldus’s finding that the 
overall pattern of charging and sentencing in Georgia otherwise conformed 
to the statute’s intended design: leaving race aside, prosecutors and juries 
regularly imposed death as punishment in more aggravated cases and life in 
less aggravated cases. Moreover, the State could point to no specific 
factors, which, if added to the mix, would work to explain, extinguish, or 
even significantly diminish the clear racial disparities that marked the 
system’s performance.122 
Judge Forrester had been appointed to the federal bench by President 
Ronald Reagan after a professional career as strike force prosecutor for the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. He proved throughout the hearing to be an 
honest, decent, and conscientious judge. Yet the power of Baldus’s 
complex statistical case appeared to elude him. Though this Georgia Tech 
graduate possessed an intuitive understanding of people and human nature, 
he seemed lost once Baldus’s testimony moved beyond cross-tabular 
results—where every tested factor is visible and every case is included in 
some cell—to the more rarified mathematical world of regression 
analysis.123 
Six months after the hearing, Judge Forrester entered an order denying 
relief to Warren McCleskey on his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 121 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 463–64. 
 122 Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 254 n.64. 
 123 See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 136–38, 153 n.21 (critiquing the district court’s 
opinion and examining some of its methodological misunderstandings). 
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racial discrimination claims.124 Forrester’s opinion faulted nearly every 
aspect of Baldus’s study: the data sources on which Baldus had relied; his 
data collection and cleaning methods; some apparent inconsistences 
between the earlier Procedural Reform Study and the Charging and 
Sentencing Study; his treatment of variables coded as “unknown” in cases 
where no definitive clarity about their presence appeared in the record; the 
absence of data on factors in some of the cases; his use of a thirty-nine-
variable model; his ostensibly low R-squared statistics; and the 
multicollinearity of some of his larger models.125 The Court nonetheless 
granted Warren McCleskey a new trial because of a misrepresentation by a 
key witness against McCleskey, which, Judge Forrester found, may well 
have affected the jury’s judgment on the witness’s credibility, and thus, of 
McCleskey’s guilt.126 
We appealed the decision, expecting to present argument to a three-
judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit after briefs had been filed. Yet the 
Eleventh Circuit decided to forgo customary three-judge consideration and 
proceed directly to en banc review by all twelve of the Circuit’s judges.127 
The oral argument on June 12, 1984 veered between questions about the 
statistical evidence and issues of constitutional theory. At one point, 
however, Judge Robert Vance of Alabama made an observation about the 
potential reach of any ruling for McCleskey: “You say there is racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing. Candidly, I think there’s likely to be 
discrimination in every kind of criminal case. Just what are we supposed to 
do?” I responded that the Supreme Court had held that “death is different,” 
 
 124 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 125 Id. at 354–64; see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 340–41, 366 n.84. Baldus later provided an 
extensive, methodological critique of the district court’s conclusions. See id. at 450–78. Professor Gross 
notes with irony that Judge Forrester (1) first demanded that McCleskey’s analysis must take into 
account all relevant factors, (2) then observed that only the method of multiple regression analysis was 
capable of doing so, and yet, (3) held that since multivariate analysis does not, by definition, offer proof 
of an individual state actor’s state of mind on the issue of intent to discriminate in a particular case, 
statistical analysis provided no evidence of value to McCleskey’s claims of discriminatory treatment. 
GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 137. 
 126 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 380–84. McCleskey was able to establish at his federal hearing that 
the State had failed fully to disclose to McCleskey’s jury during trial an offer of assistance with pending 
federal charges made by the chief police investigator to a key witness against McCleskey. That 
nondisclosure violated the well-known Giglio rule, requiring disclosure of any incentive the state has 
offered a witness in custody—such as release from custody or a plea reduced charges—in exchange for 
trial testimony against a defendant. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See generally BALDUS 
ET AL., supra note 48, at 342, 367 n.86. 
 127 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that “[t]his case was 
taken en banc principally to consider the argument arising in numerous capital cases that statistical 
proof shows the Georgia capital sentencing law is being administered in an unconstitutionally 
discriminatory and arbitrary and capricious matter”). 
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requiring greater assurance in capital cases against discrimination or 
arbitrariness than in other criminal cases. Judge Vance pressed the point: 
“What if the racial disparities in armed robbery cases, for example, prove 
to be very high?” Former divinity student that I was, I responded that the 
court should “gird up its loins” and enter an order banning such 
discriminatory sentencing. Judge Vance did not seem satisfied. 
Yet the Eleventh Circuit never had to wrestle with the scope of a 
favorable decision, for it decided instead to deny all relief to McCleskey on 
a nine-to-three vote.128 The majority opinion took an unusual course. While 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally provides that the 
factual findings of a district court are to be assumed correct on appeal 
unless “clearly erroneous,”129 the Circuit chose, without substantial 
comment, to discount Judge Forrester’s extensive findings about the 
infirmities of the Baldus study, and instead, “review this finding of fact by 
assuming the validity of the study,” and “rest [its] holding on the decision 
that the study, even if valid, not only supports the district judge’s 
decision . . . but compels it.”130 
Judge Paul Roney’s opinion then clarified just why the court thought 
the Baldus study “compelled” a rejection of McCleskey’s Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims. In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, when racial 
discrimination was alleged in a capital sentencing system, both the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
demanded much more than mere proof of a disparate racial impact: 
We . . . hold that proof of a disparate impact alone is insufficient to invalidate 
a capital sentencing system, unless that disparate impact is so great that it 
compels a conclusion that the system is unprincipled, irrational, arbitrary and 
capricious such that purposeful discrimination—i.e., race is intentionally 
being used as a factor in sentencing—can be presumed to permeate the 
system.131 
The Court added that statistical evidence has, at best, a marginal role 
in demonstrating intent or purpose under such a standard. Even if, as 
Baldus’s evidence showed, the influence of race was “more likely than 
not,” in a range of cases such as McCleskey’s—and Baldus had shown that 
it was likely that only twenty of every thirty-four Georgia defendants 
sentenced to death for the murder of a white victim would have received 
 
 128 Six judges joined Judge Roney’s opinion for seven members of the court. Judges Gerald Tjoflat 
and Vance each concurred separately. Id. at 878. 
 129 FED. R. CIV. P. 52. 
 130 McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895. 
 131 Id. at 892. 
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their capital sentence had their victim been black—this more-likely-than-
not evidence would still not suffice to make out an Eighth Amendment 
violation.132 Moving past this virtually insurmountable Eighth Amendment 
standard of proof, the Court declared that neither McCleskey nor any future 
defendant could overturn his death sentence on equal protection grounds 
without proof of racial animus by a specific actor in his own case, or a 
statistical showing of impact “so strong that the only permissible inference 
is one of intentional discrimination.”133 In effect, the court of appeals told 
McCleskey, Baldus, and LDF: “Go away. Not only is relief denied; this 
Court will never seriously entertain another statistical case challenging the 
racial justice of our capital sentencing system.” Adding injury to the insult, 
the court of appeals also reversed Judge Forrester’s Giglio findings, 
concluding that the State’s failure to disclose a detective’s promise to 
“speak a word” to federal authorities about pending charges against the 
State’s key witness, in exchange for his testimony against McCleskey, did 
not amount to a sufficient enough promise to justify a new trial.134 
Our petition to the Supreme Court was served on May 28, 1985.135 The 
Court chose to hold it for over a year, without decision, pending the 
outcome of another LDF capital case being considered by the Court.136 
When that case was announced on May 5, 1986, the Court automatically 
lifted the “hold” on McCleskey, and we knew a decision on McCleskey’s 
petition would be announced shortly thereafter. It came on a sunny summer 
morning in July—a short order granting review.137 
Candidly, I was surprised when the Court agreed to hear the case. Let 
me share the full extent of my naiveté. The Court carefully guards its 
overall docket. It declines to hear most petitions filed seeking review, no 
matter how strong the claims. These denials leave the lower court decisions 
in place, but they do not commit the Court one way or the other on the 
merits. Yet once review is granted, the Court must normally address and 
 
 132 Id. at 897–98. 
 133 Id. at 893 (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1983) and citing 
Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 134 Judge Roney reasoned that the State’s representations to the jailhouse witness who testified 
against McCleskey fell short of a full promise of release from custody, and therefore “offered such a 
marginal benefit . . . that it is doubtful it would motivate a reluctant witness, or that disclosure of the 
statement [to the jury] would have had any effect on his credibility.” Id. at 884. Alternatively, 
completely dismissing the findings of Judge Forrester, he concluded that any Giglio violation was a 
harmless error. Id. at 884–85. 
 135 GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159. 
 136 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 187–88 (“[T]he Justices had held McCleskey for another of the 
LDF’s death penalty challenges, Lockhardt [sic] v. McCree, a variation on the Court’s 1968 ruling in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois.”); see also GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159. 
 137 McCleskey v. Kemp, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986). 
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resolve those merits. And to do so in McCleskey’s case, in my view, put the 
Court in a difficult spot. 
First, I had become thoroughly convinced of the facts: the Baldus 
study seemed extraordinarily robust and sound, not simply because of 
Baldus’s expertise, his careful research design, and his evident care, but 
because he had so transparently and thoroughly tested his methods and his 
findings against every proposed alternative analysis and counterhypothesis, 
and because none of those tests had reduced the impact or significance of 
the racial disparities he found. The outcomes in all of his alternative 
quantitative and qualitative analyses triangulated consistently. 
Moreover, after two full years in which to consult with experts of 
every stripe, the State of Georgia’s principal response had remained little 
more than a “rope-a-dope” defense; Georgia could point to no omitted 
variable that would reduce the impact of race, no alternative model, 
however far-fetched, that might justify Georgia’s racially skewed 
sentencing patterns. Instead, all Georgia could do was recite its know-
nothing mantra: “Analysis of any capital sentencing patterns is 
impossible.”138 
Turning from facts to law, it seemed that in dismissing Baldus’s 
findings, the Eleventh Circuit majority had grossly distorted both the 
Supreme Court’s prior Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence. The Court in 1972 in Furman had struck all the nation’s 
capital statutes because of apparent patterns of arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. Thereafter, in 1976 and often since, the Court had 
reaffirmed that, constitutionally, “death was different.”139 Even though the 
Court chose in Gregg to presume that Georgia’s new statutes would work 
to cure the ills of Furman, it promised exceptionally close scrutiny of 
future capital decisions under the new and higher Eighth Amendment 
standards in order to guard against any further risk of arbitrariness—a 
higher scrutiny, when death was the penalty imposed, than in any other 
criminal justice setting.140 
 
 138 See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811), 1986 WL 727363, at 
*1–2 (“The State of Georgia stakes its case largely on two propositions: first that capital cases are so 
unique that any statistical analysis of capital sentencing patterns is impossible as a matter of law . . . .”).  
 139 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“While Furman did not hold that the 
infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, 
it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under 
our system of criminal justice.”). 
 140 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year 
prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case.”); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977) (noting that 
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Moreover, the Court based its key assumption in Gregg—that 
Georgia’s new procedures would suffice to cure the deficiencies 
condemned in Furman—solely on the absence of any “facts to the 
contrary.”141 Yet the Baldus study, in McCleskey v. Kemp, was evidence to 
the contrary. How could the High Court, I asked myself, square its own 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with Baldus’s damning new study? 
Moreover, while the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence 
had, since Washington v. Davis142 in 1976, demanded proof of intent to 
discriminate, Justice Powell, writing for the Court a year later in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,143 had 
clearly acknowledged that the invidious intent of a public body was often 
difficult to show directly. Consequently, Powell clarified, judges should 
undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence . . . as may be available.”144 Justice Stevens had earlier made just 
 
“five Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment 
from any other which may be imposed in the country. . . . It is of vital importance to the defendant and 
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason 
rather than caprice or emotion”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (declaring that “[w]hen the 
choice is between life and death,” state exclusion of potentially mitigating evidence is a “risk [that] is 
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
 141 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225. Justice White’s opinion for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice 
Rehnquist in Gregg, concurring in the judgment, expressly founded their approval of Georgia’s post-
Furman system upon a series of factual assumptions about the system’s likely operation in practice. 
Looking first at Georgia’s new roster of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, Justice White 
wrote: 
The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its 
discretion, while at the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too 
intangible to write into a statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound 
to fail. 
Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 Turning to the newly designated role of the Georgia judicial branch, which was charged to oversee 
sentences and “decid[e] whether in fact the death penalty was being administered for any given class of 
crime in a discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion,” he observed: 
[I]f the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it under the Georgia 
statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any 
given category of crime will be set aside. Petitioner has wholly failed to establish, and has not 
even attempted to establish, that the Georgia Supreme Court has failed properly to perform its 
task . . . . 
Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added). 
 Looking finally at the role of Georgia prosecutors, Justice White observed: 
Petitioner’s argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding which cases to 
try as capital felonies is unsupported by any facts. . . . This is untenable. Absent facts to the 
contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by 
factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death 
penalty if it convicts. 
Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 
 142 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 143 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 144 Id. at 266. 
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this point in his concurring opinion in Washington v. Davis: 
“[G]overnmental action . . . is frequently the product of compromise, of 
collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. . . . It [would be] 
unrealistic . . . to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the 
actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker.”145 
David Baldus’ evidence, it seemed to me, clearly met Arlington 
Heights’s standards: it offered just such a “clear pattern” of collective 
governmental decisionmaking in Georgia, and his relentless multivariate 
analysis was designed carefully to investigate all possible “grounds other 
than race,” that would have explained the racial disparities, all in a criminal 
justice system that was, as Justice Stevens aptly put it, “the product of 
compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.”146 In 
Baldus’s data, race never disappeared; no other explanations were ever 
found. 
While the Supreme Court had tinkered with its equal protection 
standards in the decade since Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, 
the Court had recently shown practical flexibility in specifying what proof 
would be required to show discrimination. Only months before certiorari 
was granted in McCleskey, Justice Powell, in Batson v. Kentucky,147 had 
expressly reframed the proof necessary to challenge a prosecutor who was 
alleged to be exercising peremptory jury challenges to remove jurors on a 
racial basis. Writing for seven members of the Court, Justice Powell drew 
from Title VII cases a method that (1) required a defendant first to present 
prima facie evidence of discrimination—often nothing more than the 
prosecutor’s unexplained exclusion of a number of prospective black 
jurors—before (2) shifting the burden to the prosecutor to explain, on 
nonracial grounds, her choices. If the prosecutor could do so, the final 
burden would then (3) shift back to the challenging defendant to show, if 
possible, that any ostensible explanation by the prosecutor was 
pretextual.148 
Such a paradigm seemed remarkably pertinent to the capital 
sentencing context, except that Baldus’s evidence had examined, not a 
handful of decisions by a single prosecutor, but rather thousands of 
decisions, looking at hundreds of factors in each decision over a seven-year 
period, a much more powerful prima facie showing than could ever emerge 
 
 145 Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens added that it would likewise be 
unrealistic “to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the 
deliberation of a participant in the decisional process.” Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 148 Id. at 93–98. 
112:1637 (2018) McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes 
1669 
in a jury selection context, where there were often no more than a few state 
decisions to examine. Moreover, nothing seemed a clearer failure of the 
Batson paradigm than the State of Georgia’s failure in McCleskey’s case to 
offer any plausible explanation for the prima facie racial disparities that 
Baldus had demonstrated. 
Finally, I reasoned that the Court would surely not falter merely 
because of McCleskey’s statistics-heavy factual case. The Court had 
regularly entertained and relied upon statistical proof of discrimination in 
other circumstances, such as the exclusion of nonwhite citizens from 
criminal grand or petit jury pools.149 Both in the Title VII employment 
area150 and the Title VIII housing area,151 moreover, statistical proof of 
disparate impact had been deemed sufficient to make out a violation. 
Indeed, in another case decided in the very spring of McCleskey’s grant of 
certiorari, Bazemore v. Friday,152 the Court had relied almost exclusively on 
a multivariate regression analysis in condemning a $395 average racial 
disparity between the pay of similarly qualified white and black North 
Carolina Agricultural Extension Agents.153 Those salary decisions had been 
made, in part, by some 100 different local governmental boards, acting 
across each of North Carolina’s 100 counties over a period of years.154 How 
like prosecutorial or jury decisions, I thought: multiple decisionmakers, 
each with a changing membership, acting across scores of counties to make 
a series of decisions, over time, with racially disparate outcomes. 
 
 149 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1977) (“The disparity proved by the 1970 
census statistics showed that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, but that, over 
an 11-year period, only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-
American. . . . The mathematical disparities that have been accepted by this Court as adequate for a 
prima facie case have all been within the range presented here.”); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 
(1970) (using statistical analysis to compare the percentage of black jurors in relation to the overall 
population); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (accepting statistical disparity between the 
percentage of black individuals on the grand jury and petit jury venires as proof of purposeful 
discrimination). 
 150 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–32 (1971) (using census data to 
compare the education levels of white and black employees in determining whether a company’s policy 
of requiring a high school diploma had racial purpose or invidious intent). 
 151 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 
1977) (affirming that discrimination in housing can be established by statistical evidence of 
discriminatory effect); United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 
1974) (examining whether a housing complex designed to meet the needs of families earning between 
$5,000 and $10,000 per year was discriminatory by comparing the relative percentages of the black and 
white populations earning that amount). The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that proof of 
disparate impact can suffice to establish a violation of Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act. Tex. Dept. of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 152 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam). 
 153 Id. at 399 (Brennan, J., joined by all other members of the Court, concurring in part). 
 154 Id. at 389–90. 
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To be sure, Bazemore had been a Title VII employment discrimination 
case decided per curiam, yet it was not the difference between the statutory 
and constitutional standards of proof that seemed most pertinent to me, but 
the Court’s confidence in the capacity of the statistical methods to uncover 
racial discrimination.155 Moreover, $395 pay differentials, while 
indefensible, paled in comparison, I thought, to differences between life 
imprisonment and death in an electric chair. 
In sum, as I weighed the options, the Court’s decision to deny 
certiorari in McCleskey would let the Court “duck” and leave the core 
issues unresolved at the highest level. 
A grant of review, on the other hand, would leave the Court with few 
options but to confront Baldus’s powerful evidence and, I reasoned, to 
uphold McCleskey’s claim. This confession of folly did not extend to my 
LDF colleagues, nor to Tony Amsterdam, nor to Julius Chambers, who in 
1984 had replaced Jack Greenberg as LDF’s Director/Counsel. It revealed 
instead my personal habit of untethered hope, which sustained me through 
twelve years of full-time capital practice. 
What didn’t I know or fully appreciate, on the morning of July 7th, 
with certiorari finally granted in McCleskey v. Kemp? Looking 
backwards—with the benefit of what we learned during the subsequent 
litigation and from the thoughtful scholarship that has followed—I see that 
I did not fully appreciate at least seven factors, seven sources of fierce 
judicial headwinds that would assault our constitutional vessel. 
(1) First, I had sensed, but did not fully understand, just how nettled 
the Court had become with LDF’s relentless constitutional attacks, and to 
some extent, with the whole style and content of Amsterdam’s campaign. 
The Court in 1972 had implicitly accepted LDF’s contention in Furman 
 
 155 As Justice Brennan noted for the Court: 
The Court of Appeals erred in stating that petitioner’s regression analyses were “unacceptable as 
evidence of discrimination,” because they did not include “all measurable variables thought to 
have an effect on salary level.” The court’s view of the evidentiary value of the regression 
analyses was plainly incorrect. While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may 
render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some 
other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors “must be considered 
unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.” Normally, failure to include variables will affect the 
analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility. 
Importantly, it is clear that a regression analysis that includes less than “all measurable 
variables” may serve to prove a plaintiff’s case. A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove 
discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Whether, in fact, such a regression analysis does carry the 
plaintiffs’ ultimate burden will depend in a given case on the factual context of each case in light 
of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the defendant. However, as long as the court 
may fairly conclude, in light of all the evidence, that it is more likely than not that impermissible 
discrimination exists, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. 
Id. at 400–01 (citations omitted). 
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that the American death penalty was on its deathbed, shriveling away, its 
continued use “cruel” and “unusual” because of its capricious infrequency. 
Yet after the Court struck down all capital statutes, thirty-five new state 
statutes soon sprang up in their wake, proof positive that LDF had either 
overstated its case or underestimated the opposition, but, in either event, 
had disappointed a Court which had expected an end to the penalty.156 
Moreover, although most of the post-Furman statutes paid implicit 
tribute to LDF’s due process critiques by adopting the remedies it had 
advocated throughout the 1960s—new bifurcated guilt and penalty trials, 
new statutory guidance for sentencing juries on how to weigh aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and new limitations on those eligible for death—
still, this medicine once taken, LDF would not relent. Back it came to the 
Court in the mid-1970s, insisting the very remedies for which it had pled so 
earnestly in principle throughout the 1960s were actually insufficient in 
practice to avoid future arbitrariness and discrimination. 
The Court’s 1976 decisions had strongly rebuffed LDF’s second wave 
of attacks, declaring, after close examination, that the sentencing regimes 
crafted by Georgia, Florida, and Texas were conceived in good faith, were 
likely to succeed in practice in avoiding system-wide arbitrariness and 
discrimination, and thus were constitutional. 
Then, back came LDF in McCleskey, in this third wave, now 
informing the Justices that all their presumptions in Gregg had been 
unfounded, their handiwork infirm: in sum, that they had collectively failed 
capital punishment’s biggest constitutional test. Some Justices, at least, 
testy at such allegations, had grown weary with the endless rounds of 
censure and fault-finding.157 
(2) I also did not fully realize how profoundly unhappy the Court had 
become with what it viewed as an onslaught of empirical evidence and 
statistical proof in capital cases. Just the Term before, in another LDF-
backed case before the Court, Lockhart v. McCree,158 the Court had 
reversed an en banc victory for death-sentenced inmates rendered by a five-
to-four majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.159 The defendants in Lockhart had amassed a host of well-designed 
 
 156 Woodward and Armstrong reported Justice Stewart’s reaction: “When the states began passing 
new death penalty laws right after the 1972 Furman decision, Stewart realized that he had 
miscalculated. ‘Professor [Anthony] Amsterdam promised us that if we decided his way this would be 
the last death case,’ Stewart told his clerks after Furman.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, 
at 432–33. 
 157 See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 189, 197. 
 158 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
 159 Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
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and convergent studies to demonstrate that the exclusion of jurors opposed 
to the death penalty at the guilt phase of a capital trial biased the guilt–
innocence deliberations in the State’s favor.160 The studies and the experts 
who testified about them during a weeklong hearing had persuaded a 
sophisticated and exacting federal trial judge, and later, the Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, that the bias was real.161 
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, however, Chief Justice 
Burger reportedly declared during the Court’s weekly conference: “Think 
of the consequences,” adding that he, for one, was “not going to be ‘bossed 
around’ by social scientists.”162 Justice Blackmun added that the whole 
claim was “typical Tony Amsterdam.”163 Justice Rehnquist eventually 
wrote for six Justices, expressing barely concealed contempt for the 
evidence.164 He worked his way through each scientific study, finding flaws 
everywhere, then turned on a dime and—in a move to be later imitated by 
Justice Powell in McCleskey—declared that the Court would 
assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both methodologically 
valid and adequate to establish that “death qualification” in fact produces 
juries somewhat more “conviction-prone” than “non-death-qualified” juries. 
We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from 
“death qualifying” juries in capital cases.165 
In effect, Justice Rehnquist held that even if (or more precisely, even 
though) the empirical evidence showed that the State was systematically 
 
 160 Id. at 232–35. 
 161 Chief Judge Donald Lay’s opinion for the Eighth Circuit majority concluded: 
In upholding the district court’s finding based upon the evidentiary record we must note: (1) the 
record here is exhaustive; it is difficult to perceive how any petitioner could make a record and an 
objection to death-qualified juries, as constituting an improper jury for the determination of guilt-
innocence, more complete than that presented here; and (2) there are no studies which contradict 
the studies submitted; in other words, all of the documented studies support the district court’s 
findings. 
Id. at 238. 
 162 LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 189. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Lockhart v. McCree 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
 165 Id. at 173. Legal counsel for the American Psychological Association, which filed an amicus 
curiae brief in Lockhart supporting the findings and conclusions of the lower federal courts, later 
observed with dismay 
Courts will cite psychological research when they believe it will enhance the elegance of their 
opinions but data are readily discarded when more traditional and legally acceptable bases for 
decision making are available. . . . [I]t is now clear that even the most unassailable and 
methodologically perfect evidence would not have convinced the majority. 
Donald N. Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 52, 57 (1987); see also ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 17–18 (1998) (noting a fierce critique of Lockhart by 
Professor J. Alexander Tanford). 
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biasing capital juries in the State’s favor in the determination of guilt or 
innocence, the bias did not violate the Sixth Amendment and would be 
tolerated. So much for empirical evidence and precise evenhandedness in 
capital cases. 
(3) A third adverse factor that had clearly gained force throughout the 
Burger Court years was federalism, the growing disinclination to second-
guess the capital/criminal justice choices of state legislatures and courts.166 
Federalism and respect for state legislative choices were, of course, integral 
to the design of the American constitutional system, and it had taken nearly 
ninety years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment for the 
Supreme Court to begin to apply, with some rigor, its own notion of 
minimum Due Process Clause standards in state criminal cases. Yet the 
Warren Court’s “criminal justice revolution”167 had prompted a strong 
countermotion. The Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations, and the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts whose composition they shaped, set out 
strongly to restore earlier Supreme Court deference to state criminal 
policies. By 1986, a majority of the Justices were determined not to go 
further, and indeed, were troubled that they had gone far too far already.168 
(4) The Court had also begun to reach the limits of its patience with 
the federal writ of habeas corpus, the principal procedure employed by 
capital defendants to assert new federal constitutional principles in 
attacking their convictions and death sentences. Prior to the mid-1960s, 
federal and state habeas corpus filings were relatively infrequent.169 Once a 
trial and direct appeal to the state’s highest court had been completed, most 
capital inmates’ legal recourse ceased for lack of assigned counsel and lack 
of perceived residual claims. In the early 1960s, however, the Warren 
Court had opened the federal courts to a much wider variety of challenges 
 
 166 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 221–22 (noting Rehnquist’s “ideological 
commitment to keep the federal courts out of certain types of cases. He argued that state legislatures, 
state governments, and state courts should be given the benefit of the doubt when it came to defining 
the individual rights of their citizens,” and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“was misapplied when used to give rights to prisoners, women or other groups”). 
 167 See discussion and authorities cited supra at note 14. 
 168 See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 172 (1995). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF 
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992). 
 169 See David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
321, 321 (1973) (noting that the number of federal habeas petitions filed nationally rose from a modest 
560 in 1950 to 871 in 1960, and then very sharply to 9,063 by 1970); see also MELTSNER, supra note 
18, at 94 (observing that when the Supreme Court announced three decisions in 1963, expanding federal 
habeas availability, “the impact on death-row inmates was enormous”). 
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to state criminal proceedings.170 LDF’s moratorium strategists seized on this 
opportunity to conscript the federal habeas writ into use, on newly framed 
issues, for virtually all capitally sentenced inmates.171 
The normally mild-mannered Justice Powell was especially hostile 
toward these consequences. Invited to the Eleventh Circuit Judicial 
Conference in 1983, Powell sharply condemned the delays from habeas 
review in capital cases and lamented that they “undermine[] public 
confidence in our system of justice and the will and ability of the courts to 
administer it.”172 
(5) Another factor that I underestimated was the difficulty the Court 
had in grasping what injustice might flow from racial disparities based on 
the race of the victim. While many judges felt some intuitive sympathy for 
claimants mistreated or devalued because of their own race, the race of 
one’s victim, by contrast, seemed at first blush a fortuity.173 It was not. 
 
 170 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (examining whether a state prisoner was deprived of his 
constitutional rights because he had been convicted based on a coerced confession); Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U.S. 293 (1963) (same). 
 171 MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 106–09. 
 172 Remarks of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., at the Eleventh 
Circuit Judicial Conference, Savannah, Georgia 8 (May 8–10, 1983). Justice Powell continued his sharp 
criticism of the Great Writ, especially in capital cases. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: Capital 
Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist was also dismissive of the writ 
and the delays necessarily inherent in federal habeas corpus review. LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 134. 
Dean Simon reported that even as a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson in the 1952 Term, “Rehnquist 
had written a memorandum advocating that the Court narrow habeas corpus remedies, expressing 
impatience with the many habeas petitions from death row inmates received by the Court.” SIMON, 
supra note 168, at 201. Later appointee Sandra Day O’Connor shared this view, adding from the 
perspective of a former state appellate judge that federal habeas review “produced a ‘strange’ and 
‘imperfect’ duplication of judicial effort ultimately demeaning to state courts.” LAZARUS, supra note 
20, at 150 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State 
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 801 (1981)). 
 173 Indeed, the internal files of Justice Powell include a memorandum he wrote to the conference 
apparently presented on the day the Court considered whether to grant review of McCleskey’s case, 
declaring: “I will vote to deny cert. on this issue,” for four principal reasons: first, because “[n]o study 
can take all of these individual circumstances into account, precisely because they are fact-specific as to 
each defendant”; second, because “the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case differ in ways 
that are real but difficult to calibrate”; third, because the Baldus study did not find race-of-defendant 
effects, but only race-of-victim effects; and finally, “the study tends to show that the system operates 
rationally as a general matter . . . [a] pattern [that] suggests precisely the kind of careful balancing of 
individual factors that the Court required in Gregg.” Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference 3 (June 27, 1986) (located in Justice 
Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law 
Library at 19–22), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9]. 
 Justice White also circulated a rare, pre-argument memorandum in McCleskey to some, though not 
all, of the Justices. See Memorandum from Byron White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Oct. 15, 1986) (located in Justice 
Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law 
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From the time of slavery and the post-Civil War “Black Codes,” states had 
regularly imposed more severe punishments to protect white lives, 
especially in interracial crimes.174 Black lives, slave or free, scarcely 
mattered in early nineteenth century criminal law, as Chief Justice Roger 
Taney so memorably observed in Dred Scott v. Sandford.175 Indeed, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause were deliberately framed to counter the reemergence in 
the post-Civil War South of new Black Codes under which African-
American citizens formally received different, and lesser, protection under 
criminal laws.176 
 Even after Southern laws were revised to appear facially neutral, 
however, the cultural power of racial subordination constantly manifested 
 
Library at 88–99), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9]. Justice White dismissed the significance of the Baldus study, in part, 
because “it does not appear to me that there is a serious argument that the Georgia system discriminates 
against black defendants,” id. at 1, and “[t]his leaves the question whether the Georgia system would be 
stricken down in toto because in some percentage of the cases, the race of the victim is determinative. I 
doubt that it should.” Id. at 4; see also LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 202. See generally David C. Baldus 
& George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on 
the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1444, 1450–53 (2004) (suggesting 
that race-of-victim discrimination presents a distinct and subtler moral question than does race-of-
defendant discrimination). 
 174 The State of Georgia, for example, compiled a comprehensive code of its accumulated state 
slavery laws in 1860. Professor Don Fehrenbacher summarized its criminal disparities in sentencing: 
Part Four, the penal code, included a separate code for slaves and free Negroes. One article of this 
unit listed the crimes for which, when committed by blacks, capital punishment was mandatory or 
discretionary. For instance, conviction of raping a white woman, which meant a prison sentence 
of two to twenty years for a white offender, carried a mandatory death penalty for Negro 
offenders. Even attempted rape of a white woman by a black man could be punished with death, 
at the discretion of the court. On the other hand, rape of a slave or free Negro by a white man was 
punishable “by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.” 
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
31 (1978). See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 6, 186–89 (describing pre-Civil War Black Codes). 
 175 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (confessing that, during the first 250 years of our colonial and national 
experience, black persons, slave or free, were “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether 
unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”). See generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF 
SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–1860, at 93–97 (1961) (describing the multiple 
challenges faced by free Blacks in Northern criminal courts, including a rule in four Midwestern states 
and California that forbade Blacks to testify in any case in which a white person was a party, which was 
applied in California, even if the black citizen was the complaining witness in a criminal case against a 
white defendant). 
 176 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 244–
47, 256–59 (1988) (observing that Civil Rights Act supporters in the 39th Congress, “rejected the entire 
idea of laws differentiating between black and white in access to the courts and penalties for crimes. 
The shadow of the Black Codes hung over these debates, and [Congressman Lyman] Trumbull began 
his discussion of the Civil Rights Bill with a reference to recent laws of Mississippi and South Carolina, 
declaring his intention ‘to destroy all these discriminations’”); see also GROSS & MAURO, supra note 
101, at 119–120. 
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itself. Gunnar Myrdal’s magisterial study, An American Dilemma, reported 
in 1944 that interracial crimes, especially those involving a white victim, 
continued to arouse especially punitive criminal responses across the South 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.177 Two early social-scientific studies in 
North Carolina in the 1940s tracked precisely these patterns,178 the same 
basic defendant/victim patterns that Marvin Wolfgang, and later David 
Baldus, were to report decades later.179 Yet several of the Justices were 
hard-pressed during the McCleskey oral argument to understand why this 
seeming racial fortuity should lead to relief for someone whose victim 
happened to be white; they missed the key point that, had McCleskey’s 
victim been black, as Baldus’s data showed, a life sentence would have 
been more likely than not, even given the troubling facts of McCleskey’s 
crime.180 
(6) Related to this last point, I only later realized, was the extent of the 
challenge involved in trying to arouse the Court’s sense of injustice over 
racial disparities in the criminal context. Many people are troubled by a 
narrative of a nonwhite person who, because of his race, has been denied a 
job, a place in a school, a home they could afford, or an opportunity to vote 
which they deserved, or had earned. Yet the persuasive burden is 
significantly greater when one who has willfully violated laws or social 
norms seeks to use constitutional objections to avoid society’s lawfully 
prescribed sanction. That most other killers of police officers in Fulton 
County had received life sentences did little, in the eyes of the Court’s 
 
 177 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 551–53 (2003). 
 178 See Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93 
(1941) (finding disparate death sentencing rates between 1930 and 1940 among 330 cases in five North 
Carolina counties—32% when Blacks murdered Whites, 13% when Whites murdered Whites, 4% when 
Blacks murdered Blacks, and a 0% when Whites murdered Blacks); Harold Garfinkel, Research Note 
on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOC. FORCES 369, 369–70, 374 (1949) (finding comparably 
disparate rates among 821 cases in ten North Carolina counties between 1930 and 1940—37%, 11%, 
4%, and 0%, respectively). 
 179 Professor Baldus has noted that these earlier results “are strikingly comparable” to his pre-
Furman findings in Georgia, revealing both race-of-defendant and race-of-victim disparities. BALDUS 
ET AL., supra note 48, at 249–50 
 180 Professor Baldus testified that seventeen police officers had been murdered in Fulton County 
(Atlanta), where Officer Schlatt had been murdered, during the years of his study. Six of those 
seventeen had, like McCleskey’s case, involved the murder of officers during investigations of 
contemporary felonies. None of the seventeen defendants eventually charged, apart from McCleskey, 
received a capital sentence. Id. at 334–35. He also estimated that in what he termed the “midrange of 
cases” measured by their “level of aggravation,” “where McCleskey’s case [wa]s located,” black 
defendants whose victims were white received death sentences between 34% and 43% of the time, 
while defendants whose victims were black received death sentences only 14%–23% of the time. Id. at 
320–21. Thus, a death sentence was roughly twice as likely, or more, in white-victim cases. 
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majority, to mitigate the seriousness of McCleskey’s own crime or to 
undermine the acceptability of his punishment.181 
(7) Lastly and most important of all, I confess to being naïve, despite 
the pattern of history in this area, about the extent to which the Court might 
be willing to divert its eyes from, minimize, trivialize, or even acquiesce in 
proven patterns of racial discrimination that manifest themselves at a 
systemic or societal level. I was chiefly worried that the Court might not 
understand the study, that it might find itself lost in the details. Yet surely, I 
thought, if they confronted honestly what Baldus had found, knowing the 
stakes were life and death, they would be compelled to stay the State’s 
hand. 
I should have known better. 
 
*          *          * 
 
There have been many fine analyses of Justice Powell’s curious 
opinion for the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.182 I will not review them. Let 
me share only my personal response. Justice Lewis Powell did what I 
thought no Justice could do: purport to accept Baldus’s data, apply Eighth 
Amendment and Equal Protection standards, and yet conclude that 
McCleskey had failed to show a violation of his constitutional rights. 
He did this in several ways: like Justice Rehnquist in Lockhart, he 
accepted as proven those parts of Baldus’s findings that were congenial to 
 
 181 Justice Powell put the proposition baldly in his opinion for the Court, 
[McCleskey] does not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a 
crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be 
imposed. . . . [A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by 
demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death 
penalty. 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 306–07 (1987). 
 182 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 194–216 (2009); 
GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159–211; KENNEDY, supra note 11, at 332–44, 388; Evan Tsen 
Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against 
Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145; see also James R. Acker, A Different 
Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986–
1989, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65 (1993); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1779, 1844–47 (2012); Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 48–49), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033169 [https://perma.cc/G7JY-AYE7]; James S. 
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82–86 (2007) (observing after a review of the majority opinion that “Justice 
Powell’s analysis supports the opposite of the conclusion he reaches”); Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of 
Constitutional Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5 
(2012). 
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his own themes and expressed radical skepticism or purposeful 
misunderstanding of the rest.183 
Beyond his dismissal of the facts and their significance in Georgia, his 
opinion distorted the legal standards so fiercely that, as other Symposium 
participants have observed, McCleskey effectively closed the book, not 
only on further racial challenges in capital sentencing but, far more 
broadly, on empirical racial challenges in other kinds of criminal cases.184 
By holding that a defendant must show direct proof of discrimination in his 
own case, Powell decreed, by circumlocution, that the federal courts should 
no longer entertain statistical cases demonstrating even strong patterns of 
discrimination, but only cases involving smoking gun confessions or 
individualized evidence of racial misconduct or malice. “Put down your 
data sets,” Justice Powell effectively instructed LDF, David Baldus, and all 
future claimants, and “step against the wall.”185 
 
 183 Although Justice Powell declared that the Court will “assume the study is valid statistically 
without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court,” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7, he later 
spoke dismissively of Baldus’s statistics as “show[ing] only a likelihood that a particular factor entered 
into some decisions,” id. at 308, adding later, that “[a]t most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy 
that appears to correlate with race,” quickly assuring the reader that “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing 
are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system,” id. at 312, and “a far cry from the major systemic 
defects identified in Furman.” Id. at 313 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)). 
 In a notable incongruity, even while dismissing the study’s overwhelming evidence of widespread 
racial disparities, Justice Powell was pleased to lift up the study’s non-racial conclusions, noting with 
evident satisfaction that  
[t]he Baldus study in fact confirms that the Georgia system results in a reasonable level of 
proportionality among the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. . . . [T]he system sorts 
out cases where the sentence of death is highly likely and highly unlikely, leaving a midrange of 
cases where the imposition of the death penalty in any particular case is less predictable. 
Id. at 313 n.36. 
 184 See KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 163 (observing that “[t]he standard the Court created in the 
McCleskey decision not only preserved the death penalty . . . [but] also made it very difficult for capital 
defendants to bring race-based constitutional claims in the future”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119–20 (2011) (identifying McCleskey as one of three 
modern Supreme Court decisions that make claims of discriminatory policing and prosecution almost 
impossible to succeed, since the demand that statistics prove some individual prosecutor, judge, or jury 
acted with discriminatory intent is virtually impossible, allowing “[t]he system as a whole [to] 
discriminate massively [since] . . . no single decision-maker is responsible for more than a small 
fraction of the discrimination, [and thus] the law holds no one accountable for it”). 
 185 Professor Amsterdam has identified “the error that lies at the heart of” McCleskey as the Court’s 
“supposi[tion] that conscious racial bigotry on the part of public officials is the sole significant form of 
government-supported racial inequality in this country today”: 
That error is both the source and the teaching of McCleskey. McCleskey assumes and declares that 
we need to worry about a denial of the Equal Protection of the Laws only in the short-lived 
situation where some individual decisionmaker, temporarily invested with the powers of 
government, is prompted by overt racial prejudice to act discriminatorily, and that we need not be 
concerned about any denial of Equal Protection in those long-continuing, culturally impacted 
situations where hundreds upon hundreds of publicly empowered actors—police, prosecutors, 
jurors, and judges—with no need for collusion and usually with no awareness of their own racial 
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As to the Court’s Eighth Amendment concern for the “risk” of 
arbitrariness demonstrated by statistical patterns of discrimination, the 
Court made clear that no risk, no matter how high, would violate the 
Constitution unless it went beyond a risk to become a virtual certainty.186 
No longer a realm in which “death is different,” requiring higher standards 
than in other cases, the Eighth Amendment rule in death sentences 
shriveled into Justice Powell’s straitened Fourteenth Amendment demand 
for proof of racial intention or purpose, by an individual actor in the 
defendant’s own case. 
Justice Powell professed that his opinion was dictated by the need to 
allow states to design their own criminal justice procedures and, especially, 
to allow discretion in capital sentencing.187 Yet as Justice John Paul Stevens 
and many subsequent analysts have observed, there were a number of 
plausible alternatives that might have struck down Georgia’s post-Furman 
sentencing system while allowing a revised, more strictly tailored capital 
system to go forward.188 
One unsparing reading of Justice Powell’s contorted decision is that 
he and the Court majority, in truth, silently concurred in views expressed in 
private by their newest colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia, in an unpublished 
memorandum circulated to the Court on January 6, 1987 after Scalia had 
 
biases, march in lockstep to produce a pattern of color-coded results that reflect the powerful 
prejudices of an entire population. 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After McCleskey, 
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 55–56 (2007). 
 186 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299–313. In one telling phrase, Justice Powell wrote that “[w]here the 
discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is 
unexplained is invidious.” Id. at 313. Yet the racial disparities reported by Baldus and his colleagues, 
far from “unexplained,” remain among the most thoroughly “explained,” tested, examined and 
reexamined findings ever presented to any American court in a criminal proceeding. 
 187 Justice Powell concluded his discussion of the statistical evidence with a stunning non sequitur: 
since Georgia had put into place procedures to prevent discrimination (and since Georgia also valued 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the use of jury trials) the significant racial disparities 
reported by the Baldus study made no constitutional difference: 
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of 
jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal 
defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk 
of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process. 
Id. Or, as Gross and Mauro titled their concluding chapter: “It’s Not Broken Because It Can’t Be 
Fixed.” GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 212. 
 188 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 366–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Baldus’s study, which showed 
that “[i]f Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants” to embrace only those 
“extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose, the 
death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the race of the offender,” the “danger of 
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not 
eradicated”). 
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read an early draft of Powell’s opinion.189 Let me quote the short memo, in 
its entirety: 
I plan to join Lewis’s opinion in this case, with two reservations. I disagree 
with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the Baldus study 
are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large 
number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit in the 
opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only be 
shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since 
it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial 
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and 
ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to 
write separately to make these points, but not until I see the dissent. 
Sincerely, Nino.190 
Justice Scalia’s memorandum appears to reveal both that he 
understood the explanatory power of multiple regression analysis and that 
he accepted Baldus’s principal findings. Yet racial discrimination, in his 
view, while “real,” was “acknowledged in the [prior] decisions of [the 
Court], and ineradicable.” Justice Scalia evidently decided never to publish 
these thoughts, yet Powell’s otherwise irrational and self-contradictory 
opinion, behind its verbal screens, can, in my view, best be understood not 
so much as a refusal to acquiesce in another LDF empirical assault, or as a 
vindication of federalism, or as an impatience with habeas corpus review, 
or as a misunderstanding of the functioning of race-of-victim 
discrimination, or even as an indifference to an “unfairness” claim asserted 
by a justly tried and convicted defendant—all the adverse factors facing 
Warren McCleskey that I underestimated in 1986. 
Instead, McCleskey seems to me best understood as an act of Grand 
Racial Avoidance: a turning away from the reality of widespread racial 
discrimination in Georgia’s capital sentencing system and an acquiescence 
to Scalia’s cynical perspective. From this perspective, systemic racial bias 
is, candidly, not confined to the past. It remains real and present in the post-
Furman capital universe. We the Court have acquiesced in it before, and 
 
 189 This unpublished memorandum, originally reported by Professor Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of 
the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035 (1994), is now available online in Washington & 
Lee’s collected archives of Justice Powell. See Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, 
Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1987) [hereinafter Scalia Memorandum] (located 
in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School 
of Law Library at 147), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9]. 
 190 Scalia Memorandum, supra note 189. 
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we will do so now. And if offered similar evidence in the future, we will do 
so again.191 
 
*          *          * 
 
What is the value of any lawsuit, or the fifteen-year campaign behind 
it, that ultimately makes such very bad law? What lessons can law students, 
or seasoned social science researchers, learn from this story, especially 
those who may passionately want to make a positive difference in this 
nation’s future? Allow me three short observations to close this great 
conference. 
First, as Symposium participant Reva Siegel has observed, campaigns 
to change law, to establish justice, often must be waged well beyond the 
law courts.192 Even when advocates elect to bring controversial social 
justice claims forward in courtrooms, they must assess not only the 
immediate likelihood of litigation success, but the social attention their 
courtroom efforts may (though by no means always will) attract to the 
important issues they present. A well-constructed litigation campaign has 
the potential to shape public understanding, even though it fails in a purely 
legal setting, if it is carried out with the greatest candor, rigor, and 
transparency. In his eloquent 2011 tribute to David Baldus, Professor 
Samuel Gross made just this point about David Baldus’s work: 
The main reason that race [remains] a powerful issue in debates about the 
death penalty is that everyone who cares knows that race plays a major role in 
determining who gets sentenced to death. And the single most important 
reason that “everybody knows” this is what happened in McCleskey. Even on 
the Supreme Court that sent Warren McCleskey to his death, even among the 
Justices who most strongly support the death penalty, nobody has tried to deny 
that racial “sympathies and antipathies” decide who lives and who dies. No 
 
 191 Long-time death penalty litigator Stephen Bright has vividly described this pattern: 
Instead of acknowledging the risk of racial discrimination and attempting to identify and eliminate 
it, both federal and state courts frequently dodge the inquiry. They deny the existence of racial 
discrimination that is apparent to everyone; employ legal fictions that have no relation to the 
reality of race relations in America today; set legal standards or burdens of proof that are 
impossible to meet; or provide wholly inadequate remedies for discrimination that is undeniable. 
All this may be done while the courts are issuing sweeping pronouncements decrying the evil of 
racial discrimination and proclaiming their “unceasing efforts” to cure it. 
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in 
Infliction of the Death Penalty, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 211, 214 (Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
 192 Siegel, supra note 4, at 1289–91. 
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Justice said otherwise in McCleskey and none have denied it since. That may 
be the enduring legacy of McCleskey.”193 
A second and related point: sometimes the weight even of powerful 
arguments and a completely thorough demonstration of their truth will not 
suffice, alone, to change deeply embedded patterns of belief, of 
understanding, and of priorities. “The race issue” did not persuade Justice 
Powell or his McCleskey majority to strike the Georgia statutes. Yet once 
Northwestern’s outstanding Center on Wrongful Convictions began in 
1999 its tireless work to document cases in which states had convicted and 
sentenced those who were actually innocent,194 a raft of former death 
penalty supporters and previously confident public officials fell into 
stunned silence, speechless before evidence that the innocent have been 
convicted, death sentenced, and perhaps, executed. I salute this 
exceptionally powerful work carried out by Northwestern and others who 
have commenced this search to rescue the truly innocent.195 It has become, 
along with racial discrimination, a second heavy “weight” that must be 
borne by all who would attempt to justify America’s continued use of the 
death penalty.196 
Finally, it is notable, as others have mentioned, how some truths gain 
their power not on first encounter, but only over time. At least six 
Justices—including the very three, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, whose 
joint opinions were the centerpiece of the Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek decision—
have since, in one fashion or another, renounced capital punishment 
altogether.197 Justice Powell’s change of mind and heart is well known. In 
 
 193 Gross, supra note 112, at 1922–23. 
 194 See Center on Wrongful Convictions, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions [https://perma.cc/W8YY-9YWG]. 
 195 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org [https://perma.cc/94TK-8UWA]. The 
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty reports that as of October 2015, 156 individuals had 
been exonerated, found innocent, and released from the nation’s death rows. Exonerations of Innocent 
Men and Women, NAT’L COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.ncadp.org/pages/innocence [http://www.ncadp.org/pages/innocence]. See generally Samuel 
R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 
111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014). 
 196 Professor Kirchmeier observes: 
[A]fter McCleskey’s case clarified that the courts would not strike down capital punishment and 
would not eliminate the risk of racial disparities, efforts to educate the public on problems with 
the death penalty began to pay off. Support for the death penalty continued to be strong, but the 
support fell below the level of the 1980s and 1990s. . . . Out of the moratorium movement, and 
out of education about the death penalty, and out of discoveries of innocent people on death row, 
significantly more people now oppose the death penalty than they did prior to the post-McCleskey 
moratorium movement. 
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 293. 
 197 The Justices who have foresworn the death penalty include Brennan and Marshall, who 
renounced the punishment absolutely in Furman, as well as Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice 
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1990, less than a year after he retired from the Court and lobbied Congress 
to curtail prisoners’ access to habeas corpus procedures, Justice Powell told 
his biographer that the one vote he regretted in his sixteen-year career of 
Supreme Court service was the one he cast in McCleskey v. Kemp. Asked if 
he meant that he had come to accept the statistical case, he responded: “No, 
I would vote the other way in any capital case.”198 
Justice Harry Blackmun, who upheld William Maxwell’s death 
sentence as an Eighth Circuit judge, wrote a powerful dissent in the 
McCleskey case, and later declared in 1994, in a routine capital certiorari 
denial in Callins v. Collins,199 that “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer 
shall tinker with the machinery of death,”200 explaining that he had come to 
see and regret the manifold infirmities of capital punishment in daily 
operation. He thus embraced the tradition of Justices Brennan and 
 
Stevens speculated that Justice Stewart, “had he remained on the Court, surely would have voted with 
the four dissenters” in McCleskey. John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/12/23/death-sentence [https://perma.cc/R4K8-
KRNB]. Justice Stephen Breyer has recently posed the question of the continued constitutionality of the 
death penalty in a dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg has also told law students that she would be in 
favor of returning to the Court’s position in Furman, and Justice O’Connor has publicly expressed that 
she harbors “serious questions” about whether the death penalty has been fairly administered. 
O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A9; see also Gross, supra note 112, at 
1918–20 (citing to interviews and opinions from Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens questioning 
the constitutionality of the death penalty). See generally KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 228–32 
(discussing Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor’s beliefs regarding the administration of the 
death penalty). 
 198 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994). Justice 
Powell’s statement is curious. If his regret reflected a developing conclusion that the death penalty 
cannot be fairly administered, it is odd to center that regret in McCleskey, rather than in Furman or 
especially his joint opinions in Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, where his participation as one of the triumvirate of 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens solidified the constitutionality of the entire modern death penalty regime. 
 It is possible that Justice Powell’s regret about his role in McCleskey reflects his discomfort as the 
author of an opinion repeatedly described as a modern Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, or 
Korematsu v. United States. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 185, at 47 (observing that “McCleskey is 
the Dred Scott decision of our time. . . . It is a decision for which our children’s children will reproach 
our generation and abhor the legal legacy we leave them”); John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Unholy Parallels Between McCleskey v. Kemp and Plessy v. Ferguson: Why McCleskey (Still) 
Matters, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 63 (2012) (discussing the parallels between McCleskey and Plessy 
and stating that “McCleskey, like Plessy, was ‘wrong the day it was decided’”); Bright, supra note 191, 
at 236 (viewing McCleskey as “more consistent with the Court’s decisions in . . . Dred Scott v. 
Sandford[] and Plessy v. Ferguson than its more recent decisions recognizing racial discrimination in 
other areas of life”); Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address by Mr. Bryan Stevenson, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1699, 1707 (2004) (comparing McCleskey to Plessy and Korematsu); Sundby, supra note 182, at 5 
(grouping McCleskey with Dred Scott, Korematsu, and Plessy).  
 199 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 200 Id. at 1145. 
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Marshall, both of whom had, since Furman, voted against death in every 
capital case that came before them.201 
Northwestern’s gift to the Supreme Court, Class of ‘47 graduate John 
Paul Stevens—who wrote a short, perceptive dissent in McCleskey202—also 
eventually joined Justice Blackmun in renouncing capital punishment. In 
2008, in Baze v. Rees,203 a case that upheld the constitutionality of 
Kentucky’s protocol for lethal injection, Justice Stevens carefully examined 
all of the principal penological justifications for the death penalty, one by 
one, and found all to be presently diminished or insignificant.204 He 
weighed four serious problems with administration of the death penalty; 
third among the four was its frequently discriminatory pattern, a pattern, he 
noted, that had been uncovered in McCleskey.205 Though Justice Stevens 
concurred with reluctance in Baze for reasons of stare decisis,206 later, in his 
retirement, in a thoughtful 2014 book, he urged a change to the text of the 
Eighth Amendment to bring a clear, constitutional end to capital 
punishment.207 
Most recently, in a 2016 dissent to the denial of certiorari in Glossip v. 
Gross,208 reminiscent of Justice Goldberg’s dissent fifty-three years earlier 
in Rudolph v. Alabama,209 Justice Stephen Breyer, with whom Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg joined, wrote that he would have invited “full briefing on 
[the] . . . basic question: whether the death penalty violates the 
Constitution.”210 Justice Breyer mused that the current death penalty may 
well be unconstitutional for at least four reasons, naming its arbitrary 
application, based on race-of-victim disparities, among the four.211 
There is no formal procedure for recalculating the votes of Justices 
who change their minds. Yet this extraordinary accumulation of expressed 
regret by Justices who have lived with the death penalty’s fitful 
 
 201 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 202 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366 (1987) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
 203 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
 204 Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 205 Id. at 83–86. 
 206 Id. at 86. 
 207 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE 
CONSTITUTION 123 (2014) (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment be modified to read: “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and usual punishments such as the death 
penalty inflicted”) (emphasis added). 
 208 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2754–55 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 209 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963). 
 210 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 211 Id. at 2756. 
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administration has added to the necessary burden of those who would 
continue to defend the death penalty. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Why should social scientists, in this time of real uncertainty about the 
Court’s future (indeed the country’s future), bother with presenting social 
science to courts, especially on issues of system-wide racial disparities? 
How can they do so, aware of the Court’s repeated failure to confront, fully 
and honestly, the continued legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, the stubborn 
and self-reinforcing social stratifications that make the future so 
challenging for millions of people of color and for the poor and 
marginalized? 
The answer I give predictably comes from my own perspective as a 
former death penalty lawyer. I learned long ago, working closely with 
clients—all still full of humanity and all of whom faced death—that they 
and we had no practical option but to struggle on with whatever tools were 
at hand. Dedicated lawyers and great social scientists can wield very 
important tools. I applaud the candor of Symposium participant Paul 
Butler212 and others who question the wisdom and effectiveness of 
participating in a legal system so historically skewed toward preserving the 
structural subordination of millions of African-American individuals and 
communities, and other people of color, who find their lives circumscribed 
by residential and educational segregation, restricted public services, often 
punitive criminal justice practices, and deliberately restricted avenues for 
political participation. 
In part, how to respond to such circumstances is a matter of 
temperament and personal disposition. We benefit from and sorely need 
prophetic voices like those of Derrick Bell213 and Paul Butler,214 or W.E.B. 
 
 212 Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1457 (2018). 
 213 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
10–14 (1992) (expressing the view that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country,” 
and that even “short-lived victories” will “slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that 
maintain white dominance” (emphasis omitted)); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51–74 (1987). 
 214 Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice 
Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1436–38, 1471–78 (2016) (contrasting the respective roles of “traditional 
civil rights organizations” such as LDF that “focus on liberal reform” with the “broader scale 
transformation,” working toward a Third Reconstruction that needs to be undertaken by the Movement 
for Black Lives and other more radically transformative groups). 
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Du Bois of an earlier era215—who speak out of a profound skepticism that 
our present system will ever work to cure its own ills. Yet I join with those 
who observe that we benefit as well from reformers like LDF’s 
leadership—Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg, Julius Chambers, Elaine 
Jones, Ted Shaw, John Payton, and Sherrilyn Ifill—who work tirelessly 
within the system, using what tools circumstances present, to press for 
incremental change toward justice. And whatever the likelihood of 
immediate change through law, we need committed social scientists in the 
tradition of David Baldus, who will explore with imagination, rigor, and 
transparent integrity, the multiple forces that create and maintain racial 
discrimination, sharing their research findings even in an era where the cry 
of “fake news” greets every unwelcome fact. 
Warren McCleskey’s execution took place in a small, one-story cinder 
block building in the far rear of the sprawling rural grounds of the Georgia 
Diagnostic and Classification Center in Jackson, Georgia.216 It was long 
 
 215 See, e.g., W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 
328, 328–29 (1935) (questioning the plausibility and desirability of legal efforts by the NAACP and 
others to press for integrated public education, and examining the illusion that civil rights litigation can 
ever lead to permanent equality for African-Americans: “I am no fool; and I know that race prejudice in 
the United States today is such that most Negroes cannot receive proper education in white 
institutions”). 
 216 McCleskey’s execution was delayed for over four years after the Supreme Court’s 1987 
decision because of defense counsel’s serendipitous discovery—from an attorney friend of 
McCleskey’s, Robert Stroup—of a twenty-one-page document, a statement made by the jailhouse 
informant, Offie Evans, who had provided damning testimony against McCleskey at his trial. 
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 35. The document clearly fell within the category of documents 
repeatedly requested from the State, without any success, by McCleskey’s trial and appellate counsel—
before trial, during trial, on appeal, and in state habeas corpus proceedings—and it strongly confirmed 
defense counsel’s earlier suspicions of a secret relationship between the key witness Evans and the 
State. 
 Once discovered in late 1987, the document led to an Atlanta jailor, Ulysses Worthy, who testified 
before Judge Owen Forrester, during a successive federal habeas hearing, that someone, likely the chief 
police investigator on the McCleskey case, Atlanta Detective Sidney Dorsey, had secretly instructed 
jailor Worthy to move Evans, who had served as a prior informant for Dorsey in other cases, to the jail 
cell next to McCleskey, and had instructed the informant Evans to “gather[] incriminating information” 
on McCleskey. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 475 (1991). 
 Faced with this unrebutted evidence that the State had violated McCleskey’s Sixth Amendment 
rights against surreptitious state questioning under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and 
McCleskey’s right to receipt of this relevant witness statement from the State, and then used this 
informant against McCleskey at trial, Judge Forrester, for the second time, reversed McCleskey’s 
capital conviction and directed a new trial. McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 
1987), at 63–97. 
 The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the District Court decision, McCleskey, 890 F.2d 342 (11th 
Cir. 1989), and the Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. McCleskey, 
499 U.S. 467. Both appellate courts faulted not the State, but defense counsel, for initially raising such a 
claim (albeit without benefit of the evidence deliberately withheld by the State) and thereafter 
“abus[ing] . . . the writ” of habeas corpus by abandoning the claim, during its earlier federal habeas 
appeals, after they had been unable to obtain evidence in support thereof. Id. at 497–503. Justice 
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after midnight on a rain-swept night. Three rows of witnesses sat in plastic 
chairs on the far side of the execution chamber into which Warren was led. 
After being strapped into Georgia’s electric chair, thick wires attached to 
his temples and legs, he was permitted some final words before his death. 
Self-composed and dignified despite the barbaric setting, Warren began to 
speak into a microphone, thanking those who had supported him, 
expressing his regret to the family of Atlanta police officer Frank Schlatt, 
and confessing the impact of his religious conversion and faith.217 
Suddenly, without any explanation, Warren’s microphone went silent, 
he was led out of the execution chamber, and all came to a halt. We later 
learned that a temporary stay of execution had been entered by a federal 
court. Some thirty-four minutes later, prison authorities determined that the 
stay had been lifted, and Warren was re-strapped into the electric chair. 
Though he began again to share his final thoughts, the microphone was not 
turned back on.218 Those of us on the far side of the thick glass partition 
realized we would hear nothing of Warren’s last words in the moments 
 
Marshall, in a bitter dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, showed how Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion rested upon a novel reinterpretation that radically tightened the “abuse of the writ” standard, 
thereby jettisoning several decades of controlling federal law on the issue, to McCleskey’s fatal 
disadvantage. Id. at 506–23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall added that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
had then applied its new standard in a way Marshall described as “hollow[]” and “dangerous[]”. Id. at 
526. 
The majority’s invocation of “the orderly administration of justice” rings hollow when the 
majority itself tosses aside established precedents without explanation, disregards the will of 
Congress, fashions rules that defy the reasonable expectations of the persons who must conform 
their conduct to the law’s dictates, and applies those rules in a way that rewards state misconduct 
and deceit. Whatever “abuse of the writ” today’s decision is designed to avert pales in comparison 
with the majority’s own abuse of the norms that inform the proper judicial function. 
Id. at 529 (citation omitted). 
 Detective Dorsey, who arranged the secret interrogation of McCleskey, was later elected Sheriff of 
DeKalb County in metropolitan Atlanta. Sheriff Dorsey lost reelection after one term and immediately 
directed several of his senior officers to assassinate his successful opponent, apparently to cover up 
widespread corruption and abuse by his office. Ironically, for his role in this brazen murder, Detective 
Dorsey was himself sentenced to life imprisonment. See Ex-Sheriff Gets Life in Death of Successor, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/16/us/ex-sheriff-gets-life-in-death-of-
successor.html [https://perma.cc/DE4X-9M3F]; see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 305–06 
(describing the circumstances surrounding Dorsey’s conviction for ordering the murder of the candidate 
who defeated him in the sheriff’s election). 
 217 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 189. McCleskey’s statement included the following: 
First of all I would like to say to the Schlatt family that I am deeply sorry and repentant for the 
suffering, hurt and pain that you have endured over the years. I wish there was something I could 
do or say that would give comfort to your lives and bring peace to it. I pray that you would find in 
your heart to forgive me for the participation in the crime that caused the loss of your loved 
one. . . . I am deeply sorry for the lives that have been altered the way they have because of my 
ignorance and stupidity. . . . This is not the end, but the beginning I hoped for—to be in the 
presence of my Lord. 
Id. 
 218 Applebome, supra note 3. 
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before his death, and Warren was apparently unaware of the silence beyond 
the death chamber.219 
Forgive me if I close with a metaphor. Those who have participated in 
this Symposium as speakers, researchers, scholars, teachers, and students, 
possess a special capacity: to turn that microphone on again, to speak out 
on racial injustices that still plague the criminal justice system. The State of 
Georgia exercised its own brute power to put Warren McCleskey to death 
in the post-midnight September darkness. Yet empirical evidence and 
constitutional arguments have their own uncanny counter-power to survive, 
regather strength, and shine light into darkness, defying adverse judicial 
decisions and our present, woeful consequences. 
Whether those labors yield prophecies that go unheeded, or reforms 
one day accomplished, I salute those who continue their ongoing empirical 
research, or statutory and constitutional analyses—in sum, who continue to 
set their shoulders against the burden of America’s 400-year legacy of 
racial injustice and subordination. 
 
 219 KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 189. 
